Politics Archive - Page 2 of 12

Parliament condemns attacks on press freedom and rule of law in Greece

Erik Marquardt on February 7, 2024

Today (Wednesday, February 7), we Members of the European Parliament voted for A resolution on the rule of law and media freedom in Greece. The Christian Democrats, together with the extreme right, had tried to prevent the vote and clear demands on the rule of law and media freedom. You can find the exact voting behavior here. In Greece, cases of spying on and harassment of journalists, opposition politicians and civil servants as well as attempts to intimidate independent media through targeted strategic lawsuits are on the rise. Last year, the Christian Democrat Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and members of the Greek government refused to meet an official delegation from the European Parliament.

Bottom of the league in press freedom

All governments, even conservative ones, must abide by the law and human rights. In Greece, attacks on democracy, fundamental rights and media freedom are part of everyday life. In the Press freedom ranking by Reporters Without Borders Greece is ranked 107th in the EU and is even worse than Qatar. The criminalization and intimidation of people seeking protection, of people who offer help to refugees and of journalists who report on refugees is shameful and must come to an end.

The Greek government's unwillingness to investigate the Pylos shipwreck, which claimed over 600 lives, is indicative of a policy that the EU must condemn. The Greek government must not be allowed to get away with blatant breaches of the law because it is covered up by its conservative party colleagues. It is important that the European Parliament has taken a clear position today, even if the conservative and right-wing groups have tried to further obscure the reality in Greece with their motions.

What does the resolution say?

The European Parliament's resolution expresses serious concerns about press freedom in Greece. It highlights the threats of physical attacks, verbal attacks, including those on high-ranking politicians and ministers, the invasion of their privacy through spyware and strategic lawsuits (SLAPPs). The Greek government is urged to take all necessary steps to bring the perpetrators to justice and restore a safe environment for all journalists.

Systematic pushbacks

Regarding the systematic pushbacks and the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, the European Parliament expresses its grave concern. It highlights the lack of progress in the investigation into the shipwreck of June 14, 2023, in which a fishing boat sank in the Ionian Sea off the coast of Pylos, killing more than 600 people on board. The resolution condemns systematic pushbacks and violence against people seeking protection, their arbitrary detention and the theft of their belongings. It expresses criticism of the conditions in the reception centers, particularly in relation to the protection of individuals from crime and access to basic sanitation.

Commission to enforce the law

Parliament calls on the Commission to assess compliance with EU law on border control and EU funding and condemns the Commission's dramatic failure to enforce EU laws on reception conditions, pushbacks and human rights. Instead of praising Greece, the EU Commission should initiate infringement proceedings. We call on the European Commission to use all means at its disposal to uphold European values and the rule of law.

Background

Study commissioned by me: "A lawless space – the systematic criminalization of refugees for driving a boat or car to Greece"

The plenary debate "Rule of law and media freedom in Greece" with a speech from me already took place in the plenary session in January and can be followed here.

Europe Brunch on right-wing extremism with Erik Marquardt and Natascha Strobl on January 27, 2024

Erik Marquardt on January 22, 2024

January 27 is a day of remembrance for the victims of National Socialism, and we would therefore like to dedicate this event to this important occasion.

At a time when right-wing extremists are meeting to draw up joint "remigration plans", there is a need for a clear stance against the right and a collective reminder of the lessons of the Second World War. What is the significance of the guiding principle „Never again“, and how can we understand it in the context of an ever-increasing shift to the right? What significance and impact does this have on the migration and asylum debates?

I, Erik Marquardt, am the spokesperson of the Greens/EFA group for the issues of refugees, migration and human rights. In my role as shadow rapporteur and co-negotiator of the European Asylum Pact (EAS), I will give you an insight into my experiences during the negotiations on the Pact. We will also analyze how the dominance of right-wing narratives in the debate on migration and asylum has influenced the course of these negotiations.

For this, we have invited Natascha Strobl. A respected political scientist and expert on right-wing extremism, Natascha will guide us through her analysis of radicalized conservatism, as detailed in her book of the same name. Together we will examine the methods and strategies she describes in the current political landscape and focus on how the lessons of the Second World War reinforce their relevance in current political events.

Together, Natascha and I will shed light on how decisively this radicalization of supposed conservatives contributes to a reduction of rights for people seeking protection.

We look forward to entering into a stimulating exchange with you.

Venue:

Kin Za, KrausnickstraÃe 23, 10115 Berlin

Date and time:

27.01.2024

10 – 12 a.m.

Registration for on-site participation:

Unfortunately, we have reached our maximum capacity for guests on site. If you still want to be there, there is still the possibility to listen online via our stream. ð¥â

ATTENTION: There is NO confirmation email after registration. The registration will still arrive. The day before the event you will receive another reminder email with all event details.

Registration for online participation

For all people who cannot attend on site, there will be an opportunity to listen in via a live stream. Please register using the form here. You will receive the link for the stream by email before the event begins.

https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUkde-vrj0uHNaMLWj0AcTpIXgN0T6-hEhA#/registration

Humanitarian aid for Syria

Erik Marquardt on November 24, 2023

Children in a camp in Idlib, Syria. Photo by Ahmed Akacha via Pexels.

Civil war has been raging in Syria since 2011, with almost three quarters of the population dependent on humanitarian aid as a result. The situation has deteriorated even further this year following the devastating earthquake in February, which affected almost 8.8 million people. The conflict also continues. As recently as October, the Syrian government once again Air strikes against Idlib and western Aleppo which led to 50 deaths and over 70,000 displacements and caused considerable damage to infrastructure.â The European Commission is providing relevant sums for humanitarian aid in Syria via DG ECHO. However, there are always doubts as to whether the aid deliveries are actually reaching the people who need them most urgently or are rather playing into the hands of Assad and his troops and what role sanctions are playing in this.

Highest number of fugitives in the world

The civil war in Syria has become one of the largest refugee movements worldwide: 6.8 million Syrians have left the country, mostly to neighboring countries. A further 6.7 million have been displaced within the country over the past twelve years of civil war. Half of the Syrian population is therefore fleeing war and persecution, and a safe return is still unthinkable. The proportion of Syrians in the global number of refugees is 20%.

Humanitarian situation

On June 14 and 15, 2023, the 7th Brussels Conference in Support of Syria and the Region took place. In addition to the UN, the EU institutions, 57 countries and over 30 international organizations took part. A total of €4.6 billion was pledged for 2023 and a further €1 billion for 2024. The conference is the most important donor conference for Syria and the region. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, the EU and its member states have contributed almost 30 billion the largest donors for Syria and the region.

9 out of 10 Syrians live in poverty, 12.4 million people are affected by food insecurity. People can barely afford even basic foodstuffs because prices have risen by 800% in the last two years. The north of Syria is also suffering from massive Drinking water shortage and contamination. There are many reasons for this. For example, droughts caused by climate change have led to historic low water levels in the Euphrates and other rivers, and wells have dried up. In addition, armed troops sometimes obstruct access to springs. Poor wastewater management leads to drinking water pollution and Cholera scone.

Border crossings in northwest Syria

A fundamental problem in Syria is access to the regions that are not under the control of the Assad regime, particularly in the north of the country. Thanks to an agreement with the Syrian government, aid deliveries for the north-west of Syria were able to cross the Bab al-Hawa border crossing in September of this year. be resumed. Russia had previously announced the extension of the opening of the border post with Turkey on July 11, 2023 with a Veto in the Security Council blocked by the United Nations. The border post was established by the Security Council in 2014 and has had to be extended every 6 months since then. In the rebel-held area, 90% of the 4.5 million inhabitants are dependent on humanitarian aid.

The crossing is therefore essential for supplying the population in north-western Syria with food and medicine, among other things. In addition to the Bab al-Hawa border crossing, the openings of the crossings in Bab al-Salam and Al-Raâee, which could be used again after the earthquake in February, have also been extended. However, only around 20 % of the aid convoys reach the region via the latter. Assad's ally Russia is trying to exert pressure on the rebel areas and increase Assad's influence through repeated blockades in the Security Council. The EU has rightly spoken out against this approach in the past Critically evaluatedas it massively restricts the provision of humanitarian aid to the many people in need.

Approach by Erdogan and the Arab League to Assad

The Turkey and Syria have been slowly approaching each other again since the winter of 2022. At the same time, Turkey is continuing airstrikes on Kurdish targets in northern Syria, which are also destroying civilian infrastructure. A rapid normalization of relations is considered unlikely, as the central objectives do not appear to be compatible. Turkey and Erdogan want more Syrian refugees to return to Syria, but Assad is resisting this. He would like to recapture all areas still held by rebels if possible, whereas Turkey does not want to lose its influence in northern Syria and fears new migration movements in the event of a regime offensive.

Assad was recently reinstated after twelve years. Arab League admitted and took part in its summit in Saudi Arabia in May. The member states of the Arab League hope that the resumption will lead to greater stability in the region. At the same time, there is talk that Assad's resumption is linked to conditions that are not public. Informal sources say that Assad has been promised investment by Arab states in the reconstruction of Syria if, in return, he allows many of the Syrians who have fled to live in Syria again, initiates a reconciliation process and stops producing the drug "Captagon". The EU in April 2023 Sanction measures imposed. In contrast to other confederations of states, the EU No sufficient reasons for movement for a normalization of relations with Syria. This also means that development cooperation remains suspended.

Misuse of humanitarian aid in Syria

Most of the money that the EU provides for Syria goes directly to UN organizations working on the ground. After the devastating earthquake at the beginning of February, there was information for the first time that the UN might open an office in the rebel-held Northwest Syria could open upbut this has not happened so far. Instead, aid has so far been coordinated via offices in areas under the control of the Syrian regime or in Turkey. In the past, there have been repeated allegations that the Assad regime UN organizations prescribes where aid may be providedunder threat of otherwise withdrawing visas. There were also accusations against the United Nations in February, when aid for the areas worst affected by the earthquake was very slow to arrive and the population was left to fend for themselves for days. Assad and his regime had repeatedly denied the Access to rebel areas preventedto starve the population and force the rebels to surrender.

Assad controls aid

Since the earthquake, Assad and Putin have repeatedly presented international sanctions as the main obstacle to humanitarian aid, which is explicitly excluded from all sanctions regimes. After a comprehensive Study by Natasha HallThe Assad regime has set up the aid structures in such a way that they are under its sole control. Almost all international organizations and aid facilities must be under the supervision of the "Syrian Arab Red Crescent" and the "Syria Trust for Development". This allows the regime to control and misappropriate aid organizations and the flow of aid across the board. In addition, the regime repeatedly abuses the exchange rate mechanism and changes it so that it can pocket large amounts of financial aid or allocate it to loyal supporters.

Recommendations for action Humanitarian aid in Syria

A large proportion of the people in Syria are dependent on humanitarian aid. However, relief supplies and financial aid may not be brought to Syria or distributed in Syria with contractual partners who have already been involved in Misappropriations involved or are under the direct control of the Assad regime. In addition, civil society should be more involved in the process of allocating humanitarian aid. Independent and local civil society organizations must be supported financially and technically to a greater extent. The inclusion of Refugee-led organizations (RLOs) can make a major contribution to this.

Tying aid to conditions

Early recovery, i.e. humanitarian aid that also focuses on longer-term strategies to improve the situation on the ground, is also a sensible approach in a long-standing conflict. However, it is important that this is linked to strict conditions. These include a principled and conflict-sensitive approach, ongoing independent monitoring and accountability, local ownership and a „whole of Syria approach“.

In order to counter situations such as the one in the Rukban refugee camp (north-west Syria, Daraa province), where thousands of Syrians have been stranded in the desert on the Jordanian border for years without access to medical care and humanitarian aid, it must be possible to provide aid on a permanent basis, without the consent of the regime or a UN mandate and without uncertainty about the opening of border crossings. The EU must also use all diplomatic means to achieve this.

My 8 goals in development cooperation

Erik Marquardt on November 20, 2023

As Deputy Chairman of the Development Committee In the European Parliament, my work focuses on European development cooperation and humanitarian aid, which, unlike in the Bundestag, is also subordinate to the Development Committee.

I am committed to an EU that combats global inequalities, acts on an equal footing with its partners, promotes democracy and the rule of law and is also open to people who have to flee to Europe from war and persecution, but also because of poverty and the consequences of the climate crisis. Even if there is more consensus on cooperation with the Global South than in other policy areas of the European Union, there are still some points with which I am dissatisfied or where I would like to achieve more as part of the Green Group

1: Stop externalization and conditionalization

The primary objective of the EU's development cooperation is to combat poverty, which is also laid down in primary law (Art. 21 (2) d) TEU). However, more and more funds that should actually be used for this purpose are being used for the Externalization of Europe's external borders or linked to the cooperation of third countries in migration management. This means that states, usually autocratic regimes, are provided with funds or granted other benefits such as duty-free access, in return for which the governments are supposed to ensure that fewer people enter Europe. Current examples of this are the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia on migration measures or the long-standing financing of the Libyan coast guard.

With the NDICI-Global Europe Instrument for External Expenditure of the EU, various EU external policy instruments were bundled at the beginning of this legislative period and a new set of rules was drawn up. Against the will of the conservative European People's Party (EPP) and the Council, we were able to ensure that only around 10% of total expenditure is to be used for migration purposes. We also fought to ensure that the concept of migration is broadly defined and also includes combating the causes of flight or promoting legal migration routes.

Nevertheless, we see that the money from the NDICI is primarily used for migration management. The aim is to prevent people from fleeing as effectively as possible instead of effectively combating the causes. This does not lead to fewer people making their way to Europe, but it does mean that more people are on the Perish on the way to the Mediterraneanthan in the Mediterranean itself.

The success of development policy projects is also increasingly being measured by how migration movements towards Europe are changing. Here too, actual core issues such as access to education, healthcare for local people, etc. are being overlooked and the focus and evaluation framework is shifting.

2: Renewed focus on combating poverty

Official development aid (ODA) must not be used primarily for be used for geopolitical purposes of the EUor the implementation of measures that pursue their own interests. The focus should always be on the actual Objectives of development cooperation and on long-term structural transformations that are necessary to achieve the sustainable development goals. These are primarily poverty reduction, investment in health systems and education, climate adaptation, gender equality and other necessary tasks. Food security is also an issue where we are unfortunately not on the right track to achieving the SDG goals. In addition to sufficient funding, it is particularly important that the right measures are taken to make countries of the Global South less dependent on food imports and to develop greater resilience to climate change, for example by promoting agroecological practices.

Even though the EU and its member states are the largest donors worldwide, the Expenditure for ODA The target of 0.7% of gross domestic product continues to be well below or only reached, if funds used domestically for refugees are also accounted forwhich leads to the absurd situation that the EU member states are the largest recipients of EU development funds. The funds must be used primarily where they are most urgently needed, i.e. in the least developed countries (LDCs) – not where the EU has the most interests.

3: Ambitious, sustainable and transparent development financingg

There are many different development finance players within the EU. In addition to the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, there are also a number of national development banks, such as KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) in Germany. In 2019 there was a ambitious advanceto bundle the EU's external development activities via a newly created bank and to better implement European priorities. This attempt failed mainly due to the member states, but a new branch of the European Investment Bank, EIB Global, was created, through which investments in third countries are to be made. The opportunity should be seized here to take higher risks when financing projects with a high social return and to better involve experts from the partner countries in project planning and implementation. This also applies to the financing of Global Gateway Projects. It must be ensured that these infrastructure projects actually benefit the local population, that funds are allocated transparently and that social and environmental standards are observed.

4: Control and participation rights of the European Parliamentnts

With the entry into force of NDICI-Global Europe, the European Development Fund (EDF), the most important financial instrument for development cooperation at European level to date, was transferred to the EU budget, giving the European Parliament – at least in theory – more control and participation rights. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case in practice.

It is extremely difficult and often only possible with the support of civil society to gain an overview of the individual financial measures in third countries, especially in the case of migration-related projects. We need more transparency here.

I also advocate better respect for the human rights component of EU funding in third countries. This includes, for example, carrying out a human rights impact assessment – in advance, as set out in the Regulation. There must also be ongoing human rights monitoring of migration management projects and the results must be disclosed to the European Parliament.

5. Cohesion, so that private sector and geopolitical interests do not continue to stand in the way of development policy interests.n

Unfortunately, trade and geopolitical interests before development policy goals. People in countries of the global south often do not benefit to the same extent from free trade agreements and are exploited in order to obtain resources and labor cheaply. Theoretically, there is a claim here within the EU, Coherence between the various laws and initiatives. In practice, however, there is often a lack of political will to pull together and do real work that helps poorer countries in the long term. Numerous other examples can be cited here, such as the export of pesticides not approved in Europe to the Global South or the promotion of critical raw materials for the internal market without respecting the right to consultation and free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples.

6. not focusing too much on public-private partnerships

In public-private partnerships, projects are implemented by private companies and supported by public funds and the risk is reduced – so-called de-risking. The Problem The problem here is that this form of implementation often does not work in the regions where investment is most needed, as the risk is too high despite public support and therefore remains unattractive for private investors. As a result, only projects in already better developed regions are implemented and the aspect of poverty reduction for people who are most in need cannot be realized.

7: Partnership at eye level – listening to civil society in the global south

Civil society and local authorities in the global south are often not listened to enough and are only inadequately involved in projects or not at all. More work needs to be done with local representatives on the ground, as the participation of local people is essential for the long-term success of development projects. We need more bottom-up approaches instead of falling into neo-colonial patterns.

It is also important that sufficient funds are available for projects that support civil society organizations, democracy and the rule of law, and that bureaucratic hurdles are reduced so that smaller local organizations can also benefit from EU funding.

8. promote gender equality at all levels

Goal 5 of the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 (SDGs) is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Here, too, there have been global setbacks, especially during the coronavirus pandemic. One of our negotiating successes for NDICI-Global Europe was the establishment of a 85% Target of all new measures to contribute to gender equality, in 5 % this goal should be the top priority. The Commission must ensure that this is not just a compulsory exercise, but that it produces concrete results. In addition, the Gender Action Plan III be fully implemented and additional investments made to address the regression in the recognition and protection of reproductive health and reproductive rights (SRHR).

I am looking for reinforcement for my team!

Erik Marquardt on November 10, 2023

In order to support my parliamentary work in the European Parliament, I am looking for a new member of staff for my Berlin office as soon as possible.

Local Assistant (m/f/d) for Social Media and Public Relations

Tasks

Support in preparing my parliamentary work for social media

Support in creating content for social media channels (Instagram, Twitter, Facebook) as well as for the homepage.

Observation of the news situation and trends on relevant topics

Conception of communication strategies, campaigns and social media formats

Support in the organization of various events

If necessary, accompaniment at appointments and events

Required skills

Experience in content production for high-reach accounts

(Professional) experience in politics, preferably in a political office or political association

The ability to present and formulate complicated political issues in a clear and understandable way.

Experience, creativity and enjoyment of digital storytelling.
good knowledge in image and video editing

A flair for different communication channels, trends, and pitfalls.

Good organizational skills, structured way of working, ability to work in a team and flexibility

Political judgment, interest and identification with the goals and values of green politics.

Interest in and knowledge of European politics

Very good written and oral expression skills

Fluent in German and English, other European languages are an advantage

Job size

This is a temporary part-time position (15-25 hours per week) until the end of the current 9th legislative term (July 2024).

Main working location is Berlin, business trips within Germany as well as to Brussels or Strasbourg required.

Mobile working is possible for part of the working time

Application procedure

Send your documents â a maximum of one page letter of motivation and a maximum of two pages CV (both in a single PDF document) – to erik.marquardt@europarl.europa.eu.
Salary expectations are welcome to be included.
Please include âapplication social mediaâ as the email subject.

Application deadline is the Sunday, November 26.

Applications from women*, people with a migration background and people with disabilities are expressly welcome.

I am looking forward to your application!

Introduction of digital Schengen visas

Erik Marquardt on 19 October 2023

The EU Parliament passed the law on the introduction of digital Schengen visas on October 18. Prior to this, the Committee on Home Affairs had already Vote the negotiation results achieved with the Council on the Introduction of digital Schengen visas confirmed and thus adopted. You can find my speech on the debate in the plenary of the European Parliament here.

It is planned to introduce a QR code similar to the ESTA system in the USA, which will replace the conventional sticker in the passport. A common EU application platform will be set up to make the application and processing accessible online. This will simplify the application process for 104 countries, allowing a large number of people easier access to a Schengen visa and easing the burden on foreign missions. An important step to make the Schengen area fit for the future.

As my group's shadow rapporteur, I was particularly committed to ensuring that people with limited digital skills and applicants from regions with unstable internet connections also have access to the digital visa application process. It was also important to me that the personal data of applicants is strongly protected. You can download the adopted text here find.

A Europe for all?

Erik Marquardt on September 8, 2023

European policy talks in a cozy atmosphere

The Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, already more than 2000 deaths in the Mediterranean this year, high inflation that makes life unaffordable for many, the massive consequences of the climate crisis, a shift to the right in Europe: the list of challenges facing the European Union is long and we have to be careful that social cohesion in Europe does not fall short.

Is European solidarity the key to getting out of the crises? Is a Europe for all feasible?

The MEP Erik Marquardt is responsible for the topics of flight, migration and human rights in the Green parliamentary group. He will report on the current status of the Common European Asylum System and explore the question of which steps are necessary on the way to a humanitarian and human rights-based asylum system.

Rasmus Andresen is the spokesman for the German Greens in the European Parliament and a member of the Budget and Finance Committees. He will discuss social issues in the current crisis policy and the consequences of the current economic and financial policy.

We cordially invite you to European political discussions with delicious food and drinks

A Europe for all?

On September 14 at 19:00

in the tree house Berlin

Gerichtstr. 23, 13347 Berlin-Wedding

Registration:

Please register using the form below as we have limited capacity on site.

For all people who cannot attend on site, there will be a possibility to listen via a live stream. You will receive the link via email shortly before the event starts, please register for this as well.

The panel discussion of the event will be recorded.

Frontex shows no interest in Crotone reconnaissance

Erik Marquardt on September 8, 2023

From joint research by Lighthouse Reports, El País, Sky News, Le Monde, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Domani, it emerges that the Italian government lied about its role in the Crotone boat accident that killed 94 people, including 35 children, and that Frontex helped cover up the incident. I sent a question to the Commission with 25 MEPs from four political groups, which was answered on August 3.

No interest in clarification

Now Frontex has also responded to our question. Specifically, we asked:

What is Frontex's assessment of the revelations, especially in light of the fact that they are not in line with the information provided before the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs statements made by its Executive Director, Hans Leijtens, on May 23, 2023. be in harmony?

Unfortunately, Frontex's answer does not show much interest in a reappraisal. The Executive Director only claims that the ship was not in an emergency situation when it was sighted by Frontex six hours before the incident. He also claims that Frontex correctly informed the Italian authorities.

Information is also withheld from the press

Frontex also refuses to to provide the press with relevant information about the case. So far, the agency has published only one e-mail, which was sent immediately after the accident. Dozens of other documents remain under lock and key. Frontex justifies this by saying that it is important information on ongoing operations. In addition, the agency claims the information could be used by smugglers. These arguments are not very convincing, because smugglers do not primarily act according to where Frontex happens to be. The clarification of the accident that led to so many deaths should have priority here.

EU migration agreement with Tunisia

Erik Marquardt on August 24, 2023

On July 16, 2023, the European Commission adopted, without consulting the Council and the European Parliament, a migration agreement (âmemorandum of understandingâ) signed with Tunisia. What is wrong with this and why human rights are not in the foreground in this deal, I have among other things explained in the NDR and I would like to explain this once again in detail in this article.

Current situation in Tunisia

Under Acting President Kais Saied, a massive dismantling of democracy in Tunisia. Saied spreads racist slogans, makes blacks the scapegoats of the economic problems in his country, and spreads the right-wing conspiracy theory of the âgreat exchangeâ, claiming that there is a plot afoot, „to change the demographic composition of Tunisia“. This agitation culminated in hunts and pogrom-like riots against black people in Tunisia.

In the meantime, Tunisian authorities seem to have increasingly systematically abandoned people in the desert and left them to fend for themselves. Thus, only recently a group of over 80 people rescued by Libyan border guardspreviously released by Tunisia in the desert. In the desert of North Africa more people may die than on the Mediterranean SeaHowever, there is much less documented – coordinated rescue missions in the desert do not exist.

According to UNHCR figures Tunisia has replaced Libya as the largest transit country since last year. Since the beginning of 2023 A total of 104,808 protection seekers arrived in Italy by sea. According to Tunisian National Guard data 34,290 people were prevented from fleeing Tunisia from January to the end of June 2023, nearly four times more than in the same period in 2022.

At the same time, the situation for refugees in Tunisia is very bad. There is no functioning asylum system and no other legal framework to protect asylum seekers or to grant residence permits.

Migration cooperation with Tunisia to date

There is a longstanding cooperation between Tunisia and the EU in the field of migration. In 2012, a Privileged Partnership was established and an Action Plan for the period 2013 to 2017 was adopted. The action plan addressed the protection of asylum seekers and refugees as well as cooperation in the areas of migration, mobility, and security. In parallel, in 2014, a Mobility partnership was established. This should lead to the conclusion of two agreements: the first on readmission and a second on the facilitation of visa formalities.

Negotiations for a readmission agreement between the EU and Tunisia began in 2016. Tunisia has signed and generally respected bilateral readmission agreements with six member states (including Italy, Germany, and Belgium), but they are limited to Tunisian nationals.

Even the 1998 readmission agreement with Italy, which provides for the repatriation of foreigners, excludes the readmission of third-country nationals from member states of the Arab Maghreb Union to Tunisia.

Already in 2017, Tunisia had rejected the EUâ€™s proposals to âoutsourceâ migration management; Saied also emphasized that Tunisia does not want to become âEuropeâ€™s border guardâ. However, the EU has been financing migration measures (for border control) in Tunisia for years, among others through EU Trust Fund for Africa (expiring) and through NDICI – Global Europe. There, the âMulti-countryâ Migration Program for the Southern Neighborhood 2021-2027 2021 allocated 25 million euros to support the development of border management facilities. In particular, for the support of the training infrastructure of the Tunisian Guard Nationale Maritime, support for the establishment of a coordination center for sea rescue and completion of the integrated coastal surveillance system. In addition, EUR 14 million was allocated in 2021 to support the return of Tunisians. Here is a detailed report to this.

The content of the âdeclaration of intentâ

On June 11, at a Press conference Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (as âTeam Europeâ) presented the planned package of measures during a visit to Tunis, preceded by several visits by various representatives of the EU and its member states in the months before. Von der Leyen underscored the historic partnership between the EU and Tunisia and emphasized the intention to work with Tunisia on a âcomprehensive packageâ that would focus on 5 pillars supports:

Support economic development Mobilization of up to â¬ 900 million for macro-financial assistance (linked to IMF criteria/ IMF loan of 1.9 billion), plus â¬ 150 million in immediate budget support (funds that flow directly into the state budget).
Investment and trade – Modernization trade agreements, investment in digital infrastructure etc.
Energy – Production and export of renewable energy (including ELMED cable).
Migration Support for border management and anti-smuggling, sea rescue and repatriation, for which the EU budget will provide â'¬ 105 million in 2023.
âPeople to people contactsâ/ People communication – Measures for exchange and cooperation such as Erasmus+, in the research field, vocational training measures, etc.

On July 16, the corresponding Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed, which takes up and deepens the above points. The legal status of the MoU is not clear, and the parliament was not involved, which would have been necessary if it were an agreement.

Macrofinancial support

The text does not provide any specific figures on macrofinancial support; more detailed information will be discussed in the third quarter â23.

With regard to cooperation in the field of migration, the following points are primarily mentioned:

Irregular migration is to be combated (in line with previous cooperation in the areas of border protection, support for the Tunisian coast guard, combating smuggling), and legal migration routes are to be opened up.
Tunisia to be supported in deporting third-country nationals ("irregular migrants") to their countries of origin
Development cooperation should aim at combating the causes of flight (e.g. through training measures)
Saied's position, already expressed in advance, that Tunisia is not a "host country" and that no border protection is carried out beyond its own borders is reiterated
Return measures from the EU refer only to Tunisian nationals, not third-country nationals
the EU should support Tunisia in concluding similar bilateral agreements with member states
for all these measures financial support is provided by the EU

The extent to which these points from the MoU are implemented in practice, what implications they have for the human rights situation in Tunisia, or what priorities are set, cannot yet be answered. There has been no impact assessment with regard to fundamental and human rights, nor has there been an impact assessment with regard to the question of whether the intended goals can be achieved with the corresponding measures.

The further procedure

According to Article 218 TFEU, international treaties concluded by the EU with third countries require the consent of the European Parliament. A "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed here by the Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy Olivér Várhelyi and the Tunisian Foreign Minister Mounir Ben Rijba. The individual points are then to be implemented in different procedures. In the Interior Committee of the European Parliament on 18.07.23 members of various parliamentary groups have articulated clear doubts and called for a legal opinion to clarify the legal nature of the agreement. This is particularly relevant because it is unclear which decision-making structures will be applied at all and what role Parliament will have in this process.

Also from the Council Legal Service, the European External Action Service, and numerous member state there is said to have been vehement criticismthat the agreement was signed without their consultation, legal action was reserved.
The announced macro-financial assistance of up to €900 million retains, according to so far informal information from the Commission, a successful agreement with the IMF as a precondition and also requires a legal act of the Council and the EP (ordinary legislative procedure). The additionally announced budget support and other measures can be funded from the 2023 budget via various financing instruments, whereby the EP has no formal role in deciding on the specific allocation of funds. However, the procedure and the allocation of funds have so far been so opaque that it is not yet possible to make a final assessment.

Rating

Most of the measures in the MoU are not new, nor do they represent a U-turn in cooperation between the EU and Tunisia or the entire southern neighborhood. It is also important that the EU does not turn its back on the Tunisian people, and many of the announced measures, such as the exchange on the inclusion of Tunisia in the Erasmus+ program, are to be supported. However, the de facto linking of financial support against cooperation in the migration sector is critical. Even though according to the MoU human rights standards are to be respected, this is not further defined, and a human rights impact assessment is not foreseen. Experience in Libya, for example, shows that without concrete measures and law enforcement in this area, massive human rights violations can go unpunished in practice, and they also have no influence on the funding of cooperation. It is also questionable how compliance with these standards will be verified if we are already failing with them at our own external borders. The largely unconditional cooperation in the area of migration and the allocation of funds (especially budget support directly for the state budget) without clearly defined conditions send a devastating signal. This is especially true as democratic structures are increasingly dismantled in Tunisia and basic rights of refugees in the country are not respected. The EU ("Team Europe") is obviously trying by all means to stop migration movements, although many of those seeking protection would be entitled to asylum in the EU. In particular, partners in third countries are used, because they want to achieve things that the EU states themselves are not allowed to do under human rights law – for example, disembarking shipwrecked asylum seekers in Tunisia.

In my view, one of the main criticisms of the agreement is the planned support of Tunisia in the repatriation of "irregular migrants" to their countries of origin, while at the same time a national asylum law has not been implemented in Tunisia and thus all procedures lie with the UNHCR. Instead of investing money in (ineffective) border protection and supporting an autocratic regime, efforts should rather be made to create a binding legal framework and adequate structures for protection seekers in Tunisia.

Overall, the opportunity to reach a transparent and progressive agreement that achieves a sustainable improvement in the human rights situation in Tunisia, creates legal migration channels and a joint partnership that could help end the deaths on the Mediterranean Sea has been missed here so far. While some points from the agreement are welcome, it remains to be seen whether these points will actually be implemented, as many points from such agreements have not been implemented in the past once the money-for-migration deal has worked.

Migration agreements should be discussed in parliaments and negotiated transparently. In recent years, however, governments and the EU Commission have increasingly shunned parliaments and the public when new deals are being negotiated. Where this leads has been shown in the failed EU-Turkey deal and in Libya, where, according to the UN Commission, we are now supporting smuggling structures with taxpayer money. This kind of thing should not happen again in Tunisia, but it is happening now.

One should not transfer hundreds of millions to an autocrat without having a clear plan. Tunisian President Kais Saied is engaged in a massive dismantling of democracy, spreading conspiracy theories and stirring up racist sentiment. With this deal, the EU is not only supporting an autocrat, it is also making itself vulnerable to blackmail from him. In recent weeks, evidence has mounted that Tunisia is simply abandoning refugees in the desert without water or food. Those responsible in Tunisia are accepting the death of people on the run. The EU strategy is short-sighted and naive, they believe they can buy their way out of responsibility with money. European asylum policy should not be dependent on a right-wing populist government in Italy and its good contacts with an autocrat in Tunisia.

Question: Human trafficking by Libyan coast guard

Erik Marquardt on August 23, 2023

European Union and Libya. The concept of relationship between EU and Libya.

I have asked the Commission what it thinks about the fact that the Libyan coast guard, which it supports, is itself involved in smuggling and human trafficking. This includes a person who is on the sanctions list of the United Nations Security Council.

In its response, the Commission says that the human rights violations and conditions in detention centers in Libya are unacceptable. Nevertheless, the Commission supports the very entities that bring people to these camps. So the Commission knows that basic human rights are being violated here, but is not willing to align its policy with these basic human rights. The Commission talks about saving lives, but in most cases these are not rescue operations, but pull-backs, in which people are taken against their will to the civil war country Libya, so that they do not apply for asylum in the EU.

The reference to the fact that the people in Libya would be even worse off without EU aid is a red herring, since my question is not about cooperation in general, but very specifically about the Libyan coast guard. The Commissionâ€™s claim that there is a â€œsolid monitoring mechanismâ€ is wishful thinking. The Commission supports an organization that, according to the UN, violates basic human rights and believes that it can give money to this organization without supporting the violation of basic human rights. In addition, there is a massive lack of transparency towards the parliament, because evaluations and monitoring are not disclosed. Despite repeated requests, we MEPs do not have a precise overview of the EU funds for Libya.

All my questions and the answers of the Commission can be found here.

My request

From the recent report of the independent fact-finding mission of the United Nations Human Rights Council. on Libya reveals evidence that units and members of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard are collaborating with smugglers and are themselves involved in human trafficking, particularly in the western Libyan region of Zawiya. It has been revealed that the Libyan Coast Guard in this area is in cahoots with the al-Nasr detention center in Zawiya. The unitâ€™s commander, Abd al-Rahman al-Milad (nicknamed âBijaâ), has been on trial since June 2018 for involvement in human trafficking. United Nations Security Council Sanctions List.

1) When did the Commission learn about this and what information does it have about this collusion in the Zawiya region?

2) What action will the Commission take in response to the findings that have come to light and will this result in the cessation of cooperation with or financial support for the so-called Libyan Coast Guard? 3) What steps can we expect the Commission to take after the publication of this report with regard to Italy in light of the countryâ€™s cooperation with Libya and the so-called Libyan Coast Guard?

Given the complex situation in Libya, EU-funded programs in Libya are implemented according to the principle of harm reduction and with a conflict-sensitive and rights-based approach, ensuring respect for human rights and due diligence as well as restrictive measures. The Commission pays close attention to ensuring that individuals working on ther Sanctions List of the United Nations Security Council will not benefit from EU funds. EU and Italian support for the Libyan coast guard plays a crucial role in saving lives at sea. The human rights violations in Libya and the conditions in the detention centers are unacceptable.

In line with the strategic guidelines of the European Council, the Commission continues to work with the Libyan authorities to build capacity for effective border management, in line with international standards and respect for human rights, to save lives at sea and to combat smuggling and trafficking networks. Despite the difficult situation in Libya, the situation of those most in need would not improve if EU assistance in the country were to be temporarily suspended or if the EU were to withdraw from the country altogether.

The EU, together with its implementing partners, has a robust monitoring mechanism for the assistance provided to Libya. Third party monitoring is also carried out, focusing in particular on compliance with the harm reduction principle. Furthermore, the Commission carries out ad hoc evaluation and monitoring missions. As regards the provision of search and rescue vessels to the Libyan coast guard, the delivery followed the signing of an agreement between Italy and Libya, which includes guarantees for the respect of human rights and the monitoring of the use of the vessels.