Refugees in Greece receive money from the EU through this programme

In order to support the protection seekers on the Greek islands, the UNHCR has set up a Cash Assistance Programme. Under this scheme, a fixed monthly amount is transferred to an account for the protection seekers, which they can then dispose of freely. 

In principle, the Cash Assistance Programme is intended to offer people seeking protection the opportunity to organise their basic needs according to their individual requirements. It is intended to give them a degree of autonomy in a situation in which they are otherwise unable to shape their own living conditions. At the same time, an attempt is made to build up relationships with the population, to make it easier for them to settle in and to support the local economy. 

It is not comparable to an income or social assistance, to which there is a legal entitlement, but is intended to support people in shaping their own opportunities to provide for themselves. 

Who gets money? 

To determine who is entitled to the payment, the Greek government, together with the European Union Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, agreed on a list of criteria: 

  • Arrived in Greece after 1 January 2015 
  • Registered by the Greek authorities and residing in Greece
  • Provisional or completed registration by the determining authority
  • Official document issued by the Greek Government confirming their identity and residence status.
  • Over 18 years old 
  • Living in camps or other accommodation (protection seekers in private accommodation are excluded) 
  • Not employed by an NGO or UN agency
  • Not employed and without income 

How will the money be distributed?

The money, 99.80% of which comes from the European Union, is distributed by a consortium called the Greece Cash Alliance (GCA) in cooperation with the Greek Ministry of Migration Policy. The GCA consists of the UNHCR, Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, International Federation of the Red Cross and Samaritan's Purse. 

The people who are supported receive a "UNHCR Greece Cash Alliance Card", which works like any other giro card in Greece. This means that money can be withdrawn as well as paid with the card in the shops. The cards only work in Greece and will be permanently deactivated if attempted to be used outside. Those seeking protection are required to regularly certify their presence in the country and their current eligibility to one of the GCA partners.

How long will those seeking protection be supported? 

There is no minimum or maximum period. Protection seekers are supported until they no longer meet the requirements. This means that the protection seekers are actually always only safe until the next appointment with the GCA partner that it continues. Of course, it is possible to change the requirements and this also leads to the fact that money is no longer paid out to certain persons. It is also possible that the amount of money will change. Here it is unclear on what benchmarks the amount is measured and on what basis who determines changes. Currently in Greece, for example, the number of meals received in the camps is deducted from the monthly amounts. 

How much and where does the money come from? 

A total of €83 779 826.13 was distributed in 2020. Broken down to February 2021, 64 726 people in Greece received Cash Assistance, with a total of 37245 cards in circulation. This makes a total amount of almost €7.3 million for February 2021. 

Currently, the amounts are so high: 

Amount in places where regular meals are provided 

Single person over 18 90€
Couple, parent and child140€
family of 3190€
family of 4240€
family of 5290€
family of 6310€
Family of 7 or more330€

Amount in places where regular meals are not provided 

Single person over 18 150€
Couple, parent and child280€
family of 3340€
family of 4400€
family of 5450€
family of 6500€
Family of 7 or more550€

Study shows: EU Commission may finance sea rescue operations

I have commissioned a study ( German / English), which examines which legal obligations and competences the European Union has in sea rescue. This also applies to EU military operations.

In March 2020, the EU decided to launch the Marine Emission Irinito monitor arms smuggling into Libya using satellite information, at sea and from the air. This military operation is taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean, far from the central flight route across the Mediterranean. This extremely deadly route is the only way for many people seeking protection to reach the EU. 

Irini has so far not a single person rescued from distress at sea. The predecessor mission Sophia, on the other hand, rescued around 45,000 people from 2015. However, under pressure from EU states, the ships now bypass the migration routes so as not to have to rescue people. Nevertheless, the German government is in favour of continuing Irini. Currently 19 German soldiers are participating in the mission. In the past, doubts have also arisen as to whether the mission can even achieve its goal of enforcing the arms embargo to Libya.

People continue to drown in the Mediterranean

Although fewer and fewer people are fleeing across the central Mediterranean, there has been a steady increase in death and missing person rates. In the first three months of 2021 alone are already over 300 people drowned in the Mediterranean. 

It is often argued that people would no longer put themselves in danger if there were no sea rescue. But in reality, the conditions in Libya, especially for people from sub-Saharan Africa, are so inhumane that people continue to flee. Even without rescue at sea, people board unseaworthy boats in the hope of reaching land on their own.. Even without rescue at sea, it is even more perilous for many people to reach Malta or Italy by rubber dinghy than it already is. The widespread accusation of a pull effect through civilian sea rescue missions has also already been contradicted in previous studies.

Rescue at sea is criminalised instead of supported 


So far, it is mainly civilian organisations that are carrying out sea rescue operations. In doing so, they are increasingly criminalised by EU states, as the political interest is primarily focused on preventing people from fleeing the inhumane conditions in Libya. To this end, the Libyan coast guard is being financed, which uses Frontex reconnaissance aircraft to bring people back to Libya from their flight at sea and intern them in camps. This practice has been described in several expert opinions as contrary to international law.

The European Commission claims that sea rescue operations outside its Area of expertise This is also confirmed by the European Council. It is the task of the littoral states to carry out sea rescue operations. Unfortunately, a governmental EU sea rescue mission with the participation of the Member States is not realistic in the next few years, although it is foreseeable that people will continue to drown in the Mediterranean. The Member States will not agree on a mission and it would be too easy to keep calling for things that will not happen.

EU Commission can step in and finance sea rescue operations

But there is a way out. If the EU Commission is serious about its repeatedly stated intentions to support sea rescue, it could provide financial support to non-governmental organisations and thus set up a civilian European Sea Rescue Mission. The agreement of the Member States is not required for this. This is also stated in the expert opinion commissioned by me from the law firm Redeker/Dahs/Sellner: "According to the current legal situation, financial assistance to non-governmental organisations and international institutions working to rescue refugees in distress at sea is possible, in particular, pursuant to Article 214 (3) TFEU in conjunction with the Regulation on humanitarian aid (Regulation (EC) No 1257/96)."

In short, the European Commission could fund a non-governmental sea rescue mission and thus ensure effective sea rescue. This has now also been proven by the comprehensive legal opinion.

New EU agreement facilitates deportations to Afghanistan

Afghanistan, ahead of Syria, is considered to be the most most dangerous country in the world. Despite this, deportations to Afghanistan are taking place, and despite this, the EU has once again adopted an agreement that is intended to further facilitate deportations to Afghanistan. This document, drawn up between the Commission and the Council, was signed at the beginning of February without the EU Parliament having any say in the matter. 

New Afghanistan Agreement

The new repatriation agreement JDMC (Joint Declaration on Migration Cooperation) replaces the Joint Way Forward (JWF) agreement negotiated in 2016. In terms of content, the new agreement is a further step backwards for those seeking protection from the country, which has been ravaged by war and economic crisis. In my November article I explained the JWF and its importance for deportations, as well as the situation for protection seekers from Afghanistan. Numerous civic organizations opposed the extension of the JWF agreement. The new return agreement is based on the JWF agreement, but there are a number of changes:

Thus, the definition of vulnerable groups more narrowly defined. From now on, deportations of sick people should only be suspended for people who suffer from a very serious illness and - this concretion is new – cannot be treated in Afghanistan. The latter will probably be very difficult to prove in concrete cases. The possibility for deportations will also be facilitated, as the definition of a family unit will be limited to parents and minor children. In addition, all EU member states are to participate in deportations to Afghanistan, regardless of any bilateral agreements with the civil war country. The agreement allows for joint deportations of up to 50 people per flight, with a total of up to 500 people to be deported per month in the future, although this number can be increased. In the previous agreement, there was an unofficial agreement that there would be no more than one flight per week from Europe. This will now be significantly increased, but it can be assumed that the Afghan Government will not accept a figure of more than 500 per week. 

While the JWF agreement is valid for two years, the new framework is unlimited in time through the JDMC. Instead, the new agreement can only be suspended after consultation and at a certain point in the year.

tightened security

After the end of the first round of negotiations in Afghanistan in December 2020, the Doha peace talks resumed at the end of February 2021, but progress is very slow. There is no ceasefire and the security situation is increasingly deteriorating. Violence is at its highest level in the last 20 years, and in recent months there has been an increase in targeted attacks on journalists, human rights activists and civil servants. The EU Commissioner for Conflict Management, Janez Lenarčič, recently stated in his report that Travelogue to the civil war-torn country, that the conflict was permeating every corner of the country, causing millions of civilians to be displaced and seek refuge inside and outside the country. Afghanistan has the second largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons in the world. In total, almost half the population depend on humanitarian aid. Without it, 16.9 million people in Afghanistan would be at risk of starvation. The pandemic and natural disasters further exacerbate the situation. The country is suffering one of the biggest food crises in the world.

EU states still want to deport

Even the sick and people undergoing treatment are not protected from deportation. Only in February, against widespread protest, Germany introduced a further Collective deportation of 26 people to Afghanistan, although the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg had previously ruled in a Case-by-case decision declared a deportation to the country unlawful in connection with the current coronalage. The reason for this was the impossibility of meeting the most basic needs of food, shelter and hygiene. But the deportations continue. In 2020, the recognition rate of asylum applicants from Afghanistan was about 53 %However, it varies greatly between the different Member States and is thus like a lottery for people who have made it to Europe under the most difficult conditions. For example, it was in Bulgaria at 1%, in the Netherlands at 42%. If they return to Afghanistan, the chances of renewed immediate displacement are very high.

What can the European Parliament do?

The European Parliament has no say in the drafting and adoption of the agreement and can only resort to general rights of control. At the same time, it should be emphasised that, at least in Germany, deportations are mostly carried out on the basis of a bilateral agreement with Afghanistan. Nevertheless, I will try to get the issue on the EP agenda in the coming weeks and organise an exchange with the Commission. I would like to know what conditions are attached to EU funds for Afghanistan and where the money goes. In particular, chain deportations, in which people are deported to Afghanistan who are not even from the country, must be prevented. Only one Fraction of the refugees from Afghanistan come to Europe at all, a large part is taken in by the neighbouring countries Pakistan (1.42 million in 2020) and Iran (951000 in 2020). – of a total of 2.7 million refugees These countries must be supported by the EU, we need a better distribution of responsibility, which is also called for in the Global Compact for Refugees. Progressive and people-friendly solutions should be highlighted and mobilised. Afghanistan is not and will not remain safe in the near future, which is why we must continue to prevent deportations to the country.

Five years of the EU-Turkey deal: How time was bought and not used

Five years ago, the European Council and the Commission agreed with Turkey on on a deal. 

The deal was meant to prevent people from Turkey from fleeing to Europe in greater numbers. The zenith of the 2015 crisis, in which hundreds of thousands came to Europe, had long since been exceeded and the arrival figures have already dropped significantly. Nevertheless, the aim was to prevent people from continuing to flee to Europe via Turkey. 

The deal was a precedent for a policy that seeks to externalise the EU's borders: The border to the EU should no longer be at the EU's external borders, but already in Turkey or North Africa. The heads of state have not yet been able to agree on a robust asylum system for the EU. The only thing they have agreed on so far is that people should be stopped outside the EU, and those who do arrive are often housed in inhumane mass camps like Moria.

What was agreed in the EU-Turkey deal?

Turkey agreed to take measures to prevent irregular migration. In return the country was promised billions in aid. The deal also stipulated that Syrian refugees who nevertheless reached the Greek islands irregularly from Turkey would be returned to Turkey. For each person returned, one person who had fled Syria was to be resettled from Turkey to the EU. This part of the deal was never actually implemented. Between the first quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2020, approximately 27,000 Syrian refugees were resettled from all over Turkey to EU countries. Especially in the last year, hardly any people were resettled. So in recent years, less than 1% of Syrian refugees in Turkey have had the opportunity to come to Europe legally.

In return for the prevention of flight from Turkey, Ankara was also to receive accelerated visa facilitation for its citizens. However, these visa facilitations do not exist until today, to which Turkey regularly refers. In fact, Turkey has never met all the conditions for visa facilitation. However, since complying with the rules was not realistic even five years ago, one can assume that Turkey expects the facilitations as a bonus away from the usual procedure.

The most important and expensive point of the agreement was the payment of a total of 6 billion euros for various projects to support Syrian refugees in Turkey. Contrary to some claims, the money was actually flowing and much of it had already arrived. 


The commitments made at the time show, above all, that the Heads of State and Government were prepared to make very large concessions in order for the deal to take effect. The European Parliament was not involved in the negotiation of the deal. 

Legally questionable decisions

The decisions to implement the EU-Turkey deal were already legally questionable. The Greek government under Alexis Tsipras at the time was pressured into pushing a bad law through its parliament so that the deal could be implemented. Greece recognised Turkey as a "safe third countryso that it is easier to deport people there. At the same time, thousands of people have fled and are still fleeing from Turkey itself due to political persecution. Turkey is not only not a safe country for all refugees. It is not even a safe country for many of its own citizens. Greece had little choice at the time, as they were threatened that closing the northern Macedonian border would leave them alone with the refugees crossing Europe.

By returning Syrians to Turkey, the EU is also supporting a policy that ultimately amounts to deportations to Syria, because it expects Turkey to "take all necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes from opening up to illegal migration“".

In the meantime, European authorities are systematically pushing people from Greece to Turkey or deporting them illegally. This is an attempt to reduce dependence on Turkey at the expense of human rights and dignity and to decimate the number of people seeking protection in Europe.  In Turkey, on the other hand, war refugees from Syria are threatened with deportation to their home country. This is life-threatening for many. The people are not only threatened by the acts of war, but also by the torture prisons of the Assad regime, in which tens of thousands of people disappeared. Among them also people, who returned to Syria, or forced to return. 

The fact that fewer people are actually coming at the moment is not just because of the EU-Turkey deal. It is because of the pandemic and the systematic pushback by the Greek authorities. Fewer people are not coming because of the deal, but because EU states are trampling fundamental human rights underfoot.

As a result of the deal, Turkey also sealed off the Syrian border, so the EU-Turkey deal also contributed to making it increasingly difficult to flee the Syrian civil war.

Europe makes itself vulnerable to blackmail 

In the last five years, Turkey has witnessed the European Union's capacity for blackmail on many occasions. Turkey has imprisoned opposition activists and journalists, marched with German Leopard-2 tanks in Syria and is fighting minorities in its own country. Particularly with regard to the invasion of Syria, many EU officials have been silent. Criticism of serious human rights violations is voiced, but it rarely has real political consequences, for fear that Turkey could open the borders to Greece and Bulgaria. 

The fact that the European Union still did not have a robust asylum system based on the rule of law, years after it bought itself time with the Turkey deal, took its revenge in March 2020. I myself experienced this on the ground in Lesbos a year ago. 

After Erdoğan announced an opening of the border and suddenly there were several thousand people at the external border, Greece reacted with force and simply suspended the fundamental right to asylum. That was unlawful. The Greek coast guard started shooting in the direction of rubber dinghies full of people instead of rescuing them. Boats were left in distress for hours instead of intervening immediately. A girl drowned while trying to get to Lesbos, although they could have been saved. The Greek police fired live ammunition at people and very likely killed several people in the process, for example Muhammad Gulzar. 

These actions were justified at the time with military rhetoric. The President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, described Greece as a "Protective Shield of Europe." 

The government in Ankara realised very well at the time that it could blackmail the EU by allowing a few thousand people to cross towards the EU border or even taking them there in buses. It's no wonder that on the international stage no one takes seriously a community of states that allows itself to be blackmailed by the arrival of refugees on a few rubber dinghies. 

In the EU, they try to justify this policy because they are afraid of a new 2015. But the many millions of people who are sitting on packed suitcases in Turkey to come to the EU don't exist. When Erdoğan opened the borders a year ago, not hundreds of thousands came, but only a few thousand. Among them, hardly anyone was from Syria, although Turkey is home to more than 3.5 million Syrians. Most of the refugees in Turkey live near the Syrian border. They wish to return or have settled in Turkey in recent years. Many have learned the language and found work. Most of these people do not want to go to the EU at all. 

Not everything is bad about the deal

Not everything about the deal is bad. And of course it's good for the EU to help refugees in Turkey. The EU-Turkey deal contains a list of important commitments, some of which are good and necessary. These include financial support to give Syrian refugees access to education, healthcare and the labour market. It has been made easier to allocate the funds needed for this purpose. Much of the pledged six billion euros has been launched in the meantime. 

With these funds, hundreds of thousands of children from Syria were able to attend school, people were able to see a doctor or were helped to learn the language. Much of the money went directly to aid organizations, even though the Turkish government pushed for more money to be transferred to government agencies in Turkey. Nor should the funding of the Turkish Ministry of Health and Education be condemned per se.

One of the problems with the deal, however, is that the lack of parliamentary oversight and accountability means it is not clear which projects have been successful and how.

Unfortunately, some sensible aspects of the EU-Turkey deal, such as the creation of legal escape routes, have not been adequately implemented. And despite the money from the EU, the reception conditions for refugees often do not meet humanitarian standards and real access to state services or the labour market exists for many only on paper, but not in reality. 

And what was to come next?

There is a lot of talk about the causes of flight, but they are rarely the focus of action. Instead, European asylum policy is too often shaped by short-term goals. For a future agreement, it would make sense to keep the promises of legal escape routes and redistribution and to focus on the causes of flight from Turkey instead of dysfunctional return mechanisms. The aim must be that people who have fled to Turkey do not have to flee to Europe first in order to finally be safe. However, we will not achieve this by violating human rights at the external borders, but by supporting Turkey in creating prospects for refugees. 

That is why the successful programmes in Turkey should be continued and expanded. It would be important that they not only reach people from Syria, but also the many hundreds of thousands of other refugees who come from Afghanistan, for example. One has bought time with the deal as Europe above all at the expense of human rights. Tragically, this time has not been used, but five years later the situation is worse than before: human rights violations at the external borders have now become systematic and the mass camps at the external borders serve more as a deterrent than as humane accommodation for those seeking protection. Nor has a system for the redistribution of protection seekers in the EU or the creation of legal escape routes been achieved since 2016. According to UN figures, the number of refugees worldwide has risen by around 15 million people in the last five years, despite all protestations about combating the causes of flight.

These legal migration possibilities to the EU exist

There are too few legal migration opportunities to the EU. This is a particular problem for refugees, who often have to risk their lives to apply for asylum. 

Because the EU fails to create legal escape and migration routes, people die trying to reach Europe. The EU's externalisation policy is designed to prevent people from entering European soil well before Europe's borders. This makes it very difficult for those seeking protection to apply for asylum in the EU. Despite some assurances to create increased opportunities for legal entry, little has been done in this regard. In the following, I will explain the options available to people who want to migrate legally to the EU. 

In principle, there is the possibility to enter with the "EU Blue Card" or a valid visa. Those who do not have a valid visa or the EU Blue Card can apply for asylum. 

In the year 2019 2.9 million people from third countries were granted residence permits. 41% of them obtained a work permit, 27% came to the EU for family reasons and 14% of people for educational purposes. In addition, there were 631 579 asylum applications. Legal migration accounts for the largest share of migration to the EU. In contrast, the number of illegalised border crossings is only 141 700 cases.  

In migration policy, the EU and the Member States share some responsibilities, which makes it difficult to introduce EU-wide rules on migration. While the EU can set entry requirements and residence conditions for people from third countries, it is up to the member states to implement them. They can determine how many people from third countries they grant entry and work permits to. The EU can promote the admission and integration of third-country nationals through appropriate frameworks and incentives, but national rules apply. 

The EU Blue Card 

The EU blue card was introduced in 2008 and adapted in 2017 after some shortcomings. This accelerated procedure is intended to create attractive conditions for highly qualified third-country nationals. Highly qualified persons with a university degree and an employment contract in Germany with a minimum annual income of €50,800 can enter the EU and work here with the EU Blue Card; the same applies to highly qualified persons from an area where there is a shortage of skilled workers in the EU with an employment contract with a minimum annual salary of €39,624.
More information on the Blue Card can be found at Infomigrants and in the Visaguide.

Visas

Who has a valid Visa can enter the country by plane and check in after the Schengen Borders Code move within the Schengen area. In this case, a request for asylum can be expressed orally. Those who were able to enter without a valid passport must go through an airport procedure by the police in the transit area. In the case of a refusal, an entry ban is issued. This can be appealed against. If the airport procedure or an objection lodged against it is positive, an asylum procedure is initiated.

Humanitarian visas

In addition, Member States may issue humanitarian visas to people who are not yet recognised as refugees. These can legally enter the Member State and apply for asylum here. A common European framework for this does not yet exist.

In the case of positively decided asylum applications within the meaning of the Geneva Refugee Commission or subsidiary protection, people can be relocated from one Member State to another. Here, people who have been granted international protection are entitled to similar rights as in the country of first entry. This procedure is known as Relocation known.  

An overview of the possibilities for persons seeking protection in Germany to obtain a residence permit can be found at here. Infomigrants describes the legal migration possibilities to the EU in English.

Labour migration

For the highly qualified, students and scientists, seasonal workers and people moving within companies, there are legal guidelines to facilitate migration. 

For the approximately 100,000 seasonal workers:inside in the EU regulates the Directive 2014/36/EU  the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals. These are particularly employed in the tourism and agricultural sectors. They may legally reside in the EU for a period of between five and nine months in order to work seasonally. During this period, however, their main place of residence must also be in the third country in question. 

The Directive 2014/66/EU regulates the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of a intragroup transfers. Anyone employed outside the EU in an international company can be transferred to a branch or subsidiary within the EU. 

For international trainees, students and scientists, and for Exchange students and volunteers, au pairs and educational travellers applies the Directive (EU) 2016/801. This allows students and academics to remain in the EU for a further nine months after completing their studies or research in order to find work or set up a business. Researchers are also allowed to bring family members to the EU. In the programme Erasmus+ non-EU citizens can also participate. 

Family reunion

If a family member is already legally residing in the EU, family members may join them. The Directive 2003/86/EC sets the framework for this. Thus, spouses, minor children and the children of the spouse may join them. Member States may also allow the reunification of unmarried partners, adult children and dependent parents and grandparents. The reunited family members will receive a residence permit corresponding to the already migrated family member and can apply for an independent permit after a maximum of five years. 

However, Member States may set certain criteria to authorise family reunification. For example, reunification may be linked to financial resources, suitable accommodation and health insurance, as well as "integration measures". In addition, there may be a maximum two-year waiting period. If, in the view of the authorities, there is a risk to public order, public safety or public health, the application may be rejected. Fraudulent cases such as fictitious adoption or fictitious marriage may be punished. If the applicant has been recognised as a refugee, the criteria for granting family reunification are somewhat milder. 

The regulations can be read here

Resettlement

"Resettlement means the transfer of third-country nationals in need of international protection from a third country to an EU Member State which will receive them and grant them protection."

A prerequisite for resettlement is that the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) decides that the person qualifies as a refugee under the Geneva Convention and that resettlement is the most appropriate procedure. Stateless people who do not qualify as refugees under the Geneva Convention may also be resettled. After selection by UNHCR, cases are submitted to potential host states, which decide whether to grant or refuse resettlement. The criteria of each member state and the time for resettlement vary.

Those who come to the EU under the resettlement procedure are protected against refoulement to third countries and have rights similar to those of nationals. The same applies to family members. In addition, there is the possibility of obtaining citizenship oneself. 

The European Resettlement Network explains the individual steps in the resettlement procedure and shows possibilities of obtaining a residence permit within the EU via the procedure. 

An overview of the resettlement procedure from the European Parliament's scientific service can be found at EPRS read up.

ARAPs (active refugee admission policies)

In addition, there is the possibility for states to adopt their own active policies for the reception of protection seekers. For example, new reception instruments such as private partnerships and emergency evacuations are currently being tested. Private partnerships are based on private support and funding for protection seekers. Emergency evacuations are linked to more flexible conditions than traditional resettlement procedures and are more likely to lead to temporary protection status. There is also the possibility of coming to Europe through scholarship programmes.

These ARAPS (active refugee admission policies) are voluntary. There is a risk that decisions on the admission of people in need of assistance will be based more on functional criteria than on humanitarian emergencies and that people will potentially experience discrimination. On the other hand, ARAPs can lead to protection seekers receiving protection through safe and legal channels. In addition, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides pre- and post-arrival training to promote reception and integration. 

The Escape Research Blog provides an overview of ARAPs and potential weaknesses and research gaps.

Important rights, possibilities and procedures concerning asylum in the EU can be found at here.

Anyone wishing to migrate to the EU to work, study or bring their family together can apply on the EU Immigration Portal inform 

What we demand

Legal routes to the EU need to be expanded and people need to be informed about them. We Greens call for legal and safe migration routes to the EU and flexible arrangements to facilitate family reunification and work and study within the EU for third country nationals.

We are therefore committed to the design of a EU-wide visa system for humanitarian visas a. For example, protection seekers should have more opportunities to apply for visas at embassies and consulates outside the EU so that they can enter the EU legally and safely. 

In addition, we call for a European migration code. This should protect the rights of migrants in the EU. To this end, rights within the EU must be harmonised and new and secure legal channels for migration to the EU must be created, irrespective of the migrants' qualifications and income. In particular, the rights of migrants with low incomes and low qualifications must be expanded, because the value of people is not measured in their economic usability.

There is also a need for agreements with third countries in order to avoid a brain drain in these countries. Instead, balanced partnerships should be concluded. For this, they must be decoupled from further migration control measures and readmission agreements. Partnerships could, for example, facilitate multiple entry visas and expand pilot projects.

The full position paper of the Green Group in the European Parliament on labour migration from third countries is available at here read up. 

Question: Frontex and refoulement at sea

In order to be able to exercise my parliamentary control function as a Member of the European Parliament, I have the opportunity to put questions to the European Commission. The Commission must answer these questions.
I put the following questions to the Commission:

Subject: Refoulement at sea and Frontex's call for laxer rules on the disembarkation of rescued persons in third countries

In response to media reports that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has been involved in illegal refoulement at sea in the Aegean, Frontex intends to set up an 'evaluation committee' chaired by the Commission[1]. The committee is to deal in particular with the maritime external borders regulation[2] deal with. This regulates Frontex operations at sea and implements the ban on refoulement at sea resulting from the Hirsi ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.[3] results. The agency had already complained in its annual report on the External Maritime Borders Regulation of 27 August 2020 that the rules governing Frontex operations at sea were too strict, particularly with regard to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea in third countries.[4]. This makes Frontex operations unattractive for the Member States. Under the regulation, Frontex is strictly prohibited from participating in refoulement operations at sea.

1. whether the Commission considers the establishment of such a committee to be an appropriate response to Frontex's possible involvement in refoulement at sea?

2. if the Commission intends to chair the committee, what is its objective in doing so?

3. whether the Commission can rule out the possibility of watering down the regulation on external maritime borders in order to facilitate the refoulement or disembarkation of rescued persons in third countries?

Answer given by Commissioner Ylva Johansson on behalf of the European Commission on 25/02/2021:

The Commission does not support the establishment of such a committee, as the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has already set up a working group which is currently conducting an investigation into all aspects related to the matter. This group is looking into the alleged incidents, the measures taken by Frontex, the rules governing Frontex's maritime operations and the adequacy of the Agency's reporting system. The Commission is represented in this working group.

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Secretariat-General of the European Parliament are closely involved in this process.

Any relevant questions on the practical implementation of Union law applicable to Frontex's operational activities could be addressed in the context of the ongoing discussions at Management Board level, with the understanding that a binding interpretation of Union law can only be given by the European Court of Justice.

The Commission remains committed to ensuring the effective management of our external borders in full compliance with the applicable provisions of Union law, including those relating to the protection of fundamental rights. Without prejudice to the Commission's right of initiative with regard to relevant Union policies as provided for in the Treaties, it should be noted that the revision of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014[5] is not included in the Commission's legislative programme.


[1]     https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-calls-for-committee-to-consider-questions-related-to-sea-surveillance-BMieC8

[2]     Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 laying down rules on the surveillance of the external maritime borders in the framework of the operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

[3]     Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, et al.

[4]     Frontex: Annual report on the implementation of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex 2019, 27/8/2020 (not yet published).

[5] OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 93.

Frontex inquiry group in the European Parliament starts its work

Today, February 23, 2021, met for the first time the Frontex investigation team of the European Parliament. It consists of 14 MEPs, of which I am one. The central question is whether the agency has systematically committed human rights violations. In four months' time, the group will present its first report. Even after the first inquiry, the group will continue to look into Frontex.

The accusations against the EU agency Frontex are serious. Greek officials are dragging masses of refugees out to sea and the agency is watching or even actively helping. This is proven by investigative research by independent media.

Frontex shows little interest in reconnaissance so far

On the other hand, there is little interest in reconnaissance at Frontex. Frontex internal documents show that the agency was trying to cover up crimes. Frontex chief Fabrice in particular Leggeri prevented the investigation... and also lied to us MEPs when he was summoned to the European Parliament. The following day, even Frontex's press department had to admit that Leggeri had lied. 

Despite the burden of proof, the Frontex Director continues to claim that he has no knowledge of these incidents and that Frontex is complying with human rights law. However, Leggeri himself has sent questions to the Member States concerned regarding human rights violations. It is therefore not credible that he knows nothing at all. 

Federal police involved in pushback

There are a large number of cases where Frontex is accused of human rights violations. For example, on August 10, 2020, a ship with a German crew stopped and pushed back an inflatable boat carrying refugees. Thus, German federal police officers are also involved in such activities. With the magazine Frontal 21 spoke a federal police officer also about the fact that officials are expected to break existing law and basic human rights. 

On the morning of 10 August 2020, at around 6 a.m., the German ship "DEU CPB 62", dispatched to Frontex, observes a rubber dinghy with about 40 people in Greek waters, not far from the island of Samos. It sails there, stops the boat and informs the Greek coast guard. The coast guard appears a few minutes later and takes over the situation. The German ship leaves the scene. The Greek coastguard's report subsequently states that the people seeking protection on the rubber dinghy had changed course and had returned to Turkish waters. When asked, the Greek officials confirmed that they had carried out "border protection measures to prevent a landing on Samos". 

Frontex observes pushback, but Leggeri does not classify it as a violation of fundamental rights

Another important case occurred on the night of 18-19 April 2020, when a Frontex reconnaissance aircraft flew over the Eastern Mediterranean and observed protection seekers on a Greek Coast Guard vessel and their empty inflatable boat being pulled by the Greek boat. Two hours later, the Frontex aircraft observes the protection seekers being returned to the inflatable boat by the Greek Coast Guard patrol boat, with another speedboat waiting in the immediate vicinity. Frontex also clearly states at this point that there are no Turkish boats in the vicinity. 
A few minutes later, at around 2.45 a.m. on 19 April 2020, the Frontex aircraft takes a picture of the Greek boat pulling the leashed inflatable boat with the protection seekers on board towards Turkish waters. Half an hour later, Frontex observes that the inflatable boat has no engine and the Greek boats move away from the vicinity of the boat. The next afternoon, Greek authorities confirm that the dinghy was spotted by the Turkish coast guard and taken to the Turkish mainland. Frontex officials reported the incident and Fabrice Leggeri turned to the Greek government, However, in the end, the court did not classify the case as a violation of fundamental rights.

Working group to be set up in the European Parliament

The European Parliament's Committee on Home Affairs has summoned Frontex on this several times, but we MEPs have simply been lied to. The committee has submitted written questions, but the answers have been rather modest.

The European Parliament's inquiry group will now examine the available evidence and procedures and answer the question of whether Frontex is disregarding its mandate, contributing to human rights violations and acting contrary to the EU's fundamental values and founding principles. After the initial inquiry, the group will continue to exist to monitor and scrutinise Frontex's activities.

Our goals in the working group

I am glad that the working group was set up on the initiative of the Greens/EFA Group. With my group colleague Tineke Strik, who is responsible for the first report, I will work in the investigation group to investigate the allegations against Frontex. Concrete Green objectives are the following: 

  • the drafting of an evidence-based report on the allegations against Frontex
  • Recommendations to Frontex to be implemented by the Agency
  • A consideration of fundamental rights in the mandates of the Agency
  • Changing the working culture at Frontex
  • Transparent reporting by Frontex to the public and to the European Parliament, to which it is accountable. 
  • an ongoing, transparent review of the work of Frontex 

What happens to money that the EU provides to Bosnia and Herzegovina for refugees?

Since the beginning of 2018, the EU has provided Bosnia and Herzegovina with a total of around €89 million for flight and migration. With the money should, according to the EU Commission provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and support the Bosnian authorities in migration management. 

Of this money, over €75 million came from the so-called Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). This is pre-accession assistance from the EU to promote reforms in potential EU accession countries. The money is intended to help countries become fit for the EU. A further €13.8 million came from the ECHO pot, which provides funds for emergency humanitarian aid. 

This money also includes €3.5 million made available additionally by the EU Commission at the beginning of Januaryafter the camp in Lipa burned down and hundreds of people were left homeless at the mercy of the winter in the Bosnian mountains. The money will be used for warm clothing, blankets, food and health care. The money will mainly be used to support aid organisations such as Save the Children or the Danish Refugee Council. The Danish Refugee Council, for example, used parts of the funds to important reports on the violent and illegal pushbacks through Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina to create. 


In view of the terrible situation in Bosnia, some people are now asking what happened to the money. Deutsche Welle also reported on the topic.

This is where the money goes  

However, most of the money goes to IOM in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IOM has received a total of €76.8 million from the EU since June 2018, of which €51.6 million had been drawn down by the end of 2020. This left €25.3 million at the end of the year. The IOM homepage also lists the allocation of funds. I will list the most important points here again.

On this graph you can see that a large part of the funding comes from the IPA.pot. In addition, funds for a response to Covid-19 in Bosnia and Herzegovina have also been allocated to refugees so that they are not defenceless against the virus. In view of the cramped conditions in the existing warehouses and the very close proximity of bunk beds However, it must be doubted whether this strategy of the IOM is sufficient. 

How IOM uses the funds

In this chart, IOM lists how funds have been distributed in Bosnia and Herzegovina so far. 

14 % of the funds were spent on the creation or renovation of a total of seven camps in the canton of Una-Sana and the area around Sarajevo. This includes the installation of 562 containers in the camps Ušivak, Blažuj, Lipa, Bira, Sedra, Borici and Miral, as well as the reconstruction of the former student dormitory in Borici. In addition, approximately 5900 bunk beds, over 10,000 mattresses, 1300 heaters, 45 industrial washing machines and other equipment were purchased for the camps.Approximately 2 % will be spent on IOM administration, rooms and staff in the Sarajevo and Bihać offices.

Lack of transparency in the use of funds by Bosnian authorities

At €3.4 million, around seven per cent of the money went directly to Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutions. From the money, the police received new vehicles, drones, thermal imaging cameras and heavy protective equipment for counterinsurgency. However, after seeing with my own eyes the brutality with which the Canton police crack down on refugees, I have doubts about whether this is really the best use for the funds. In addition, the funds are being used to finance 25 employees of the Bosnian Foreigners Authority. 

Unfortunately, it is not possible at present to obtain a precise breakdown of the use of funds by the Bosnian authorities. The Bosnian authorities are not providing a full report on this and are ignoring enquiries from journalists. This is not a very transparent way of dealing with European taxpayers' money. 

The allocation of funds is monitored by a committee comprising representatives of the EU Delegation to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Ministry of Security, the border police, the foreigners' offices and several aid organisations. The Bosnian authorities, in particular, must explain where the money goes if they want to dispel doubts about the correct allocation of funds.

Funds for humanitarian aid

77 % of the funds spent by IOM so far went to the area of humanitarian aid. The more than € 16 million includes expenses for heating, water, garbage collection, maintenance, as well as the costs for IOM staff. IOM currently employs a total of 423 staff in the camps, 421 of whom are Bosnian nationals. 

Almost €10.9 million was spent by IOM on the distribution of more than 8.2 million meals. In doing so, IOM collaborated with the NGO Pomozi.ba in Sarajevo Canton and the Red Cross in Una-Sana Canton. 

For the purchase of goods for daily use, the IOM has spent a total of more than € 4.7 million for 1.6 million items. These are hygiene items such as soap and toothbrushes, but also sleeping bags, winter clothing or protective masks. 

Another €4.7 million was spent on health and education. This area includes medical care and transport, as well as special protection for underage refugees and their schooling. 

Another € 3.7 million was spent on security. The money also went to private security companies, which were much criticized by residents and NGOs for treating the refugees badly or simply not doing their job. Thus, despite the presence of the security guards, in May, a man was killed in the Ušivak camp. Funds were also used for fire alarms, fire extinguishers and first aid equipment. 

The political problems cannot be solved with more money

In summary, there is still room for improvement in the transparency of the use of funds. However, the accommodation of refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not primarily a financial problem, but a political one. The entities and cantons in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not want to host refugees, shift the responsibility back and forth, and use the refugees for a political blame game to put the blame on the respective other ethnic groups or parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have provided an overview of the political challenges in an Text on my homepage and also in my podcast described. 

However, despite all the justified criticism of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we must not forget why thousands of people are stuck there in the first place. Most of them have already been to EU countries such as Greece, where they were also treated inhumanely. And they want to move on, but they are being brutally and unlawfully beaten back by the Croatian authorities. The current terrible situation for refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina is therefore also the fault of the EU states, and the Commission in particular must ensure that they finally comply with the law. 

In the short term, better conditions for refugees must be created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it can be discussed whether more money can be used to help in one place or another. However, the fundamental political problem cannot be hidden under higher sums of money. We, as citizens of the European Union, must not accept that Bosnia-Herzegovina is being misused as a dumping ground for refugees and that they are repeatedly beaten back there. 

This is why it is so difficult to sue when human rights are violated

I am often asked why people on the run do not simply sue in a court of law when their elementary human rights are violated by EU states or Frontex. This question is very legitimate, but not easy to answer. In this text, I will address some key points that make it so difficult for people on the run to claim their rights. 

Human rights are rights that the state guarantees to every individual on its territory or under its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the respective court is always given when state actors such as police, border guards or the army encounter people in the exercise of their duties. State responsibility, on the other hand, is more difficult to prove and assert when EU actors such as Frontex or the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA) act.

The burden of proof lies with the plaintiffs 

Those who claim a violation of their human rights must first prove their own involvement. In the case of pushbacks, the nature of these acts makes it difficult to prove one's own presence at the scene, as witnesses who are not also perpetrators or victims usually do not exist. Fugitives who are on a boat on the high seas and are pushed back often have no way to provide evidence of their presence on the boat after the fact because, for example, people's cell phones are collected or destroyed, or at least cell phone videos are deleted. Without evidence, an individual case claiming to have been unlawfully „collectively expelled“ or „pushed back“ is unlikely to succeed.

Lack of access to justice 

Access to justice is another early hurdle in the legal action process. If a person is on the territory of the state which that person also accuses of violating the rights, the person concerned can bring such violations before the national court of first/lower instance. The EU legal order allows individuals to bring a case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) once all national remedies in the country concerned have been exhausted, i.e. all instances of the national legal system. Thus, if a person is encountered by the border guards of a state subject to the ECtHR at sea, on territorial or extraterritorial territory, the rights and obligations deriving from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) apply. However, such actions can in fact only be brought if the person concerned is in the infringing state. This is never the case with pushbacks, or at least not until an attempt to cross the border has succeeded.

All EU member states and also associated states are parties to the ECHR. As such, they can be sued before the ECtHR. 

Refugees cannot simply sue Frontex

Things get a bit more complex if, for example, Frontex is the authority that has potentially committed the violation. As an EU agency, an action against it cannot be brought before the ECtHR but only before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The ECJ, in turn, does not hear individual rights complaints, but rather disputes between organs. So e.g. EU member state against Frontex as EU authority. Moreover, it is not easy for the persons whose rights are violated by the illegal pushback to identify who is actually acting unlawfully in the specific case under the EU flag. The command of the operation can lie with an EU Member State, a third country with a status agreement with the EBCGA or with Frontex itself.

The EU and the individual Member States are bound by the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as EU law, i.e. regulations and directives. Cases brought before the ECJ must be referred to it by the Member States or by the European Commission, the so-called guardian of the Treaties and executive of the EU. The ECJ cannot take action itself on the basis of its own investigations. Since the EU member states currently have no great interest in the European border regime being permanently criticised by the ECJ, referrals to the ECJ on the basis of their own state investigations into Frontex do not take place. In the case of Croatia or Greece, the governments do not even admit that systematic or even individual pushbacks are taking place at all.

Thus, in order for a possible pushback by Frontex against individuals who are on a boat heading towards EU territory to be heard in Luxembourg – the seat of the ECJ –, the person concerned must first be able to prove his or her presence on the boat in question. Secondly, it must be clarified on which territory the pushback took place (usually not the biggest problem) and thirdly, this state must refer the case to the ECJ. 

Lack of clarity about who is actually responsible 

If the pushback took place on the high seas, i.e. not in the territorial waters of a state, then it must also be clarified on what basis Frontex was active there to protect the border. Frontex cannot be active without consultation with the EU Member State whose borders it secures; proceedings before the ECJ must then be initiated by the Member State on whose behalf Frontex was active here.

It is possible for the person concerned to lodge the complaint with Frontex itself. But here too, the evidence described above on the location, competence of the agency, etc. must be provided. Moreover, Frontex is at least ineffective in dealing with complaints.

Regardless of the possibilities and difficulties described above, it is even more complicated to file a lawsuit after a pushback from a third country.

Long and unrealistic legal action 

There are directives and regulations that bind EU member states to certain high standards, including in asylum policy. If rules, such as reception conditions, are violated by EU member states, either the European Commission initiates so-called infringement proceedings against the country to ensure that EU law is properly implemented, or a person suffering from the terrible conditions can initiate proceedings against the country in question for the suffering caused by the conditions. But again, they would have to go through the process of appeals, i.e. they would have to file a lawsuit in Germany with the locally competent administrative court, and if the lawsuit is dismissed, they would then go on to the competent higher administrative court, then to the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Constitutional Court. Only then can the case be referred to the ECtHR, which looks at the case from a human rights perspective and examines whether a country has violated certain ECHR rights of the person bringing the action...

In such individual proceedings, the inhuman, degrading conditions on the ground to which claimants are subjected, e.g. in a reception centre, could be challenged.Although the ECJ takes ECtHR judgments into account as precedents, the EU is not a party to the ECHR, so human rights violations by EU actors cannot be heard by the ECtHR.

Why even third parties hardly have a chance to sue successfully

When it comes to third parties who know about a human rights violation, their chance as human rights defenders, civil society organisations or interested individuals to sue on behalf of the victim is also very low. In the first instance, Member States or the European Commission have access to the Court of Justice of the EU, while the European Court of Human Rights is only accessible once all national remedies have been exhausted. Access for third parties other than the elected legal representative of the persons alleging human rights violations is not allowed without the active participation of the person concerned.

Despite obvious violations of the law, those affected have little chance to sue

In reality, these complex legal constructions mean that people on the run hardly have a chance to accuse those responsible if their basic human rights have been violated. Precisely because refugees are not citizens of an EU state and their fundamental rights are not protected by their states of origin, which is why most of them have to flee in the first place, they are usually defenceless against pushbacks, violence and undignified treatment. The fundamental rights of the United Nations, adopted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, do not apply to these people in reality. Their dignity is violated on a daily basis and yet they have hardly any possibility to defend themselves legally. 

Photo: European Court of Human Rights © BY-SA 3.0, CherryX

Question: Pushbacks by Frontex in the Aegean Sea

In order to be able to exercise my parliamentary control function as a Member of the European Parliament, I have the opportunity to put questions to the European Commission. The Commission must answer these questions.
Together with other Members, I put the following questions to the Commission:

Subject: Illegal refoulement by Frontex in the Aegean Sea

The German news magazine "Der Spiegel" today published research entitled "Frontex implicated in illegal pushbacks". The research proves in detail that officials of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) know about the illegal practices of the Greek border guards - and are partly involved in illegal pushbacks in the Aegean Sea themselves. Even though the systematic breaches of the law by Greek authorities have been known or at least obvious for months, Frontex has mostly denied even knowing about these illegal refoulements on the open sea.

The activities of Frontex and the Greek coast guard described in the article refute the Greek government's statements that border protection is being carried out in accordance with international law. Now Frontex is apparently also increasingly involved in the illegal activities.

1. since when has the Commission had information about the illegal practices of the Greek border guards or Frontex in operations at the Greek external EU border?

2. what measures the Commission intends to take to clarify these cases and ensure that international and Union law are complied with by its own agency?

3. whether the Commission is aware that, since March 2020 at the latest, EU Member States have been systematically breaking EU law at the EU's external borders, where people are mistreated and their lives put in danger, or whether the answer to this question also skilfully avoids the reality of the situation?

Answer given by Commissioner Ylva Johansson on behalf of the European Commission on 11/02/2021:

The Commission takes the allegations of pushback very seriously. Subject to the competences of the European Commission as guardian of the Treaties, national authorities are primarily responsible for the correct transposition and application of EU law. The Commission has repeatedly expressed its concerns about such reports. It has made clear that Member States have border surveillance tasks under the Schengen Borders Code.[1] fully respect fundamental rights, ensure access to international protection and guarantee protection against refoulement in accordance with Union and international law. In this context, the Commission has also urged the Greek authorities to investigate, in accordance with their competence, any alleged wrongdoing. Against this background, it is worth recalling the new migration and asylum package proposed by the Commission, which provides for all Member States to establish an independent monitoring mechanism to ensure the protection of fundamental rights at the external borders. At the formal request of the Commission, an urgent extraordinary meeting of the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) was convened on 10 November 2020 to discuss allegations of pushback operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Management Board shared the view that there was an urgent need to investigate all aspects of this matter. At the Management Board meeting of 25/26 November 2020, the matter was further discussed and a working group was established to investigate the matter in accordance with the procedure set out in Regulation[2] to further examine the established allocation of responsibilities. A second extraordinary meeting of the Management Board was convened on 9 December 2020 to review the Executive Director's written replies to questions from several members of the Management Board, including the Commission, and more generally to monitor progress in the internal investigation into alleged refoulement of migrants in the Aegean Sea.[3] The European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Secretariat General of the European Parliament are closely involved in this ongoing process and have also addressed oral and written questions to the Executive Director of the Agency. Frontex has also taken steps to fill more quickly the posts of Fundamental Rights Officer and Fundamental Rights Observers provided for in the Agency's founding Regulation.


[1] Regulation (EU) 2016/399 establishing a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1).

[2] Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1).

[3] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/extraordinary-meeting-frontex-management-board-9-december-2020_en

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