Devastating Frontex report: Commission of inquiry into sea rescue must come

Erik Marquardt on February 28, 2024

Following the Pylos shipwreck with over 600 fatalities off the Greek coast, the the European Ombudswoman Emily O’Reilly opened an investigation. Due to its mandate, it concentrated on the role of Frontex.

The report it has now presented shows that Frontex is not fulfilling its own European and human rights requirements. This is due, for example, to the fact that Frontex is too dependent on the cooperation of the member states in sea rescue cases, which do not always rescue people in distress at sea.

The investigation identifies systemic problems and a lack of independent oversight of the operations. O’Reilly appeals to the EU Parliament, Council and Commission to set up a public commission of inquiry to investigate the causes of the Mediterranean deaths and prevent them in the future.

The Ombudsman's press release can be found here.

Ombudsman publishes devastating report – "Commission of inquiry into sea rescue must come"

The report is alarming and the Ombudsman's verdict is devastating. Frontex is not fulfilling its basic legal obligations. For example, Frontex apparently found sea rescue cases, but then failed to inform the ships in the vicinity. This was also the case in the Pylos shipwreck, in which over 600 people died when the fishing trawler Adriana sank, even though Frontex had been aware of the distress at sea for many hours. Such cases must not be repeated.

Frontex offered help with the Adriana air surveillance, but received no response from Greece. The investigation identifies systematic problems because maritime emergencies are repeatedly ignored, resulting in many avoidable deaths.

However, eight months after the disaster, no steps have been taken to prevent such a catastrophe from happening again. There also seems to be no interest on the part of the Greek authorities in carrying out serious rule of law investigations. Our external borders must no longer be a lawless area where people can be allowed to drown with impunity.

That is why I support the call by European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly to set up a public commission of inquiry to investigate the thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean and prevent them in future.

Background to the investigation

On June 14, 2023, the overcrowded fishing boat Adriana sank off the coast of Pylos, Greece, drowning over 600 people. The EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, described the incident as one of the worst shipwrecks of this century and called for a thorough investigation. 

The European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly has launched an investigation. It focuses on the role of Frontex and its interaction with national authorities in maritime emergencies. The investigation found that Frontex‘ sea rescue capabilities are heavily dependent on Member States and their sea rescue operations. There is often a confusion of responsibilities that makes it easier to shirk responsibility for rescue operations and allow people to drown. 

The Ombudsman proposed that the Commission, the Council and the Parliament set up an independent commission of inquiry to assess the situation and protect fundamental rights in maritime emergencies. 

The Adriana accident is emblematic of the failure to take appropriate rescue measures, because here too, ships were not alerted for rescue despite clear signs of an emergency at sea. 

Even though the case is still being legally investigated, it is clear that more than 600 people could still be alive if appropriate sea rescue measures were taken.

Here is an excerpt from the recommendations of the EU Ombudsman O'Reilly:

More independent operational decisions by Frontex: Frontex is too closely tied to the member states when it comes to operational decisions. As a result, Frontex lacks the ability to fulfill its fundamental rights obligations. A review of operational plans and procedures may be needed to ensure that the agency can better respond to maritime emergencies, even if national authorities do not give specific instructions to rescue or report rescue cases.

Response to maritime emergencies: Frontex needs to revise its operational protocols for responding to maritime emergencies, in particular with regard to the issuing of mayday relays, i.e. the reporting of maritime emergencies to surrounding vessels. The Agency should consider whether its criteria for assessing maritime emergencies and deciding to issue mayday relays are sufficient to take into account the particular circumstances of boats and prevent death at sea.

Handling of information from third parties: Frontex should improve its practices for assessing and integrating information provided by non-governmental organizations and other unofficial sources. In particular, reported threats to children should be a top priority.

Relationship with national authorities: The investigation underlines the need for Frontex to reconsider its relations with national authorities, especially in cases where there are doubts about a Member State's compliance with fundamental rights. Frontex should be prepared to cease, withdraw or suspend its activities with a Member State if the threshold for serious fundamental rights violations has been reached. Explicit reference is made here to Greece.

Improve the legal framework for search and rescue operations: There is a need for a clear EU legal framework for search and rescue operations that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of Frontex and the Member States and enables the agency to fulfill its fundamental rights obligations more effectively. The law of the sea was created at a time when it was unimaginable that states would refuse to rescue people in distress at sea. As these times have unfortunately changed, the legal framework should be revised at European level.

These proposals aim to improve Frontex‘ operations to save lives and ensure that fundamental and human rights obligations are respected in the context of search and rescue operations in the future.

Reform of work and residence permits

Erik Marquardt on February 28, 2024

EP Plenary session - Single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on common rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State

During the final trilogue on the recast of the Single Permit Directive in January, it was an agreement reached. 

What is the directive about?

Around 3 to 3.5 million third-country nationals enter the EU every yearmainly for professional reasons. They work in EU countries, pay taxes and, through their mobility, help companies to find urgently needed workers. The Combined Permit Directive allows these people a simplified application process and ensures that an applicant only needs one permit to both work and reside in the EU. It gives many non-EU citizens working in the EU the right to be treated like EU citizens in many respects. This applies in particular with regard to fair working conditions, social security, recognition of qualifications and tax benefits. 

History of the Single Permit Directive

The directive has been in force since 2011; the aim of the revision was to simplify the procedure for obtaining a combined work and residence permit and to make it easier for member states to recruit qualified workers from third countries. This is intended to counteract the shortage of skilled workers in the EU. In addition, labor migration is a legal alternative that can enable people seeking protection to avoid dangerous irregular escape routes. To ensure that they are protected after their arrival, the updated regulations also provide for increased protection against exploitation and unequal treatment in the Member States. Workers from third countries will receive a uniform package of rights with regard to their working conditions, social security and the recognition of their qualifications as a result of the revision. In return, they must comply with the respective regulations, otherwise their combined work and residence permit may be withdrawn.

What was important to us Greens

In the negotiations, it was important to us Greens to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and give more people access to a combined work and residence permit. In addition, we wanted better protection against exploitation when taking up work in the Member States, e.g. through an obligation to provide information and the introduction of a right to change employer as well as a strengthened right to equal treatment. I will explain some of our main concerns below.

Fewer bureaucratic hurdles

We were able to partially achieve these goals, as the agreed text contains some improvements compared to the previous regulations. For example, a maximum period of 90 days has been set for deciding on applications for a single permit, compared to the current four months. Procedures for particularly complex cases can be extended by 30 days. However, we would have very much liked these deadlines to include the potentially long-term processing times for people who need a visa. We also wanted accelerated procedures for applicants who already have a permit in another Member State or have participated in EU Talent Partnerships; Member States are now only encouraged to accelerate such applications through the recital.

Change of:employer:in

The option to change employer(s), profession and area of work was also particularly important to us. During the negotiations, we were able to ensure that a simple notification from the new employer is sufficient for such a change. However, the national authorities still have 45 days to reject the change. Member states can also stipulate a period of up to six months during which a change is not possible. An exception is made for serious breaches of the employment contract, including particularly exploitative working conditions, by the employer. Unfortunately, the provisions do not go as far as we would have liked.

Protection even in the event of unemployment

People who lose their job will now have up to three months – or six if the person has held their work permit for more than two years – to find another job before their permit is revoked. This is two – or four – months longer than was previously the case. If an employee has been exposed to particularly exploitative working conditions, the member states will extend the permitted duration of unemployment by three months, while the combined permit remains valid. In the event of unemployment for more than three months, Member States may require the holder of the single permit to prove that he or she has sufficient resources to support himself or herself without recourse to social assistance. Member States are also obliged by a new article to monitor and sanction violations of workers' rights, especially in sectors where there is a fundamentally high risk of violations of workers' rights.

What now?

The new provisions are a step in the right direction, but we must continue to work to remove obstacles to labor migration and create opportunities for protection. This includes, for example, our wish that the restrictions on the right to equal treatment in housing only apply to public housing – and not to private housing. This time, we were only able to achieve an exception for private housing and, in view of the EU's increasingly restrictive migration policy, which is based on isolation and externalization, it is also essential to promote legal migration routes such as labour migration.

Study: Beyond borders, beyond boundaries

Erik Marquardt on February 19, 2024

My Dutch colleague Tineke Strik and I have commissioned a critical analysis of the EU's financial support for border regimes in Tunisia and Libya on behalf of the Green Group in the European Parliament.

You can find the entire study here German, English and French.

A two-page summary is available on German, English, Italian, French and Arabic.

Clear failings on the part of the Commission 

The border protection measures co-financed by the European Commission and the member states regularly result in serious human rights violations. These include the use of physical force or deliberate collisions by the Tunisian coast guard or the interception and deprivation of liberty of migrants, enslavement, forced labor, imprisonment, extortion and smuggling by the Libyan coast guard. 

These are enormous sums, over € 70 million each for Libya and Tunisia for the periods from 2018 to 2022; a detailed overview can be found in the first chapter of the study.

When allocating funds, the risk of human rights violations is not sufficiently taken into account, despite corresponding provisions in the NDICI regulation, among others, through which most measures have been financed since 2021. Even during the project period, it is unclear how the projects are monitored, as the European Commission does not provide any documents, citing confidentiality.

Next steps

Funds should only be disbursed if it can be ensured that they will not be used to support measures that are associated with human rights violations. A human rights impact assessment must not only be carried out at the beginning of the project; programs must also be reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted or interrupted during their term. To this end, it is important that sufficient documents are made available to the European Parliament. Civil society also has an important role to play here; it is important that civil society organizations are consulted in funding decisions.

Further information

In order to present the study, we held a conference on the same day. Event The human rights aspects in particular were discussed with Seawatch, the authors of the study and DG NEAR; a recording of the event can be made available on request.

You can download the summary (EN/DE/FR/IT/AR) and the entire study (DE/EN/FR) here download. The SZ also has reports.

Event: Beyond the walls: How EU asylum policy disenfranchises people outside Europe

Erik Marquardt on February 14, 2024

Love all,

On February 22 at 7 p.m., my event on the outsourcing of EU asylum policy will take place. The focus will be on the externalization (outsourcing) of responsibility to third countries and everyday life at Europe's borders:

People are abandoned in the desert, EU-funded militias shoot at rescue boats, survivors in distress at sea are sold on slave markets: The list of horror stories about the treatment of refugees in Europe's neighboring countries could go on and on. And even within Europe, we are witnessing an increasing disenfranchisement of people seeking protection – for example through the reform of the CEAS. More and more attempts are being made to restrict access to asylum in Europe, and it is becoming increasingly obvious that basic human rights are being disregarded in the process.

What is the situation in Europe's neighboring countries? Who is responsible for this inhumane policy? Why are EU governments increasingly outsourcing asylum policy? And what can we do about it? We want to address these and other questions during the event and then discuss them with the audience.

We were able to invite the journalist Franziska Grillmeier and the photographer Vincent Haiges who have report on the situation for refugees at various border locations, restrictions on reporting and escape routes outside Europe using examples and photos.

I will also – Erik Marquardt – will then report on the EU's externalization policy, the role of the Parliament and the political background. I will also present the results of our study in this context: „Beyond borders, beyond boundaries – Border crossings behind external borders“. The study sheds light on the EU's financial support for border regimes in Tunisia and Libya. If you are interested, you are welcome to here have a look inside.

to the speakers: 

Franziska Grillmeier is a freelance journalist specializing in flight and migration. She has traveled with Vincent Haiges to countries such as Bulgaria, Niger, Bosnia and Herzegovina. She has spent the past five years on the island of Lesbos in Greece. There she reported for ZEIT Online, taz, BBC, WDR and the Wochenzeitung, among others. Her book "Die Insel. A Report on the State of Emergency on the Margins of Europe" was published by C.H.Beck in 2023.

Vincent Haiges is a freelance documentary photographer who reports internationally on conflicts and human rights violations. His work includes reports from Ukraine, Afghanistan and Iraq for Die Zeit, The Guardian, Foreign Policy, NZZ, Republik. He is also working on a long-term project on violence at Europe's external borders.

Erik Marquardt has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2019. There he deals with asylum, migration and human rights. He has often been to the external borders and on sea rescue missions in the Mediterranean. In Parliament, for example, he accompanied the negotiations on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) as shadow rapporteur.

Drinks and snacks are provided.

Venue: 

aquarium Südblock – narrativ e.V.
Skalitzer Str. 6
10999 Berlin

Date and time: 

22.02.2024 

19:00 – 20:30 

Registration for on-site participation: 

Unfortunately, we have reached our maximum capacity for guests on site. If you would still like to join us, you can still listen online via our stream.

ATTENTION: There is NO confirmation e-mail after registration. We will still receive your registration. The day before the event you will receive another reminder email with all the details. 

Registration for online participation

For all people who cannot attend on site, there will be an opportunity to listen in via a live stream. Please register using the form here. You will receive the link for the stream by email before the event begins.

https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZwucOqoqD8vHNSISnV-7io08q7M1V-IFFUl

Love,

Erik

Disclaimer: Film and sound recordings as well as photos will be made at the event. By attending the event, you agree to their subsequent use.

GEAS: Not a good day for European asylum law

Erik Marquardt on December 20, 2023

Photo: Erik Marquardt

The Council and Parliament have agreed on a reform towards a common European asylum system. Here you will find a brief overview of the key results of the negotiations on the GEAS package.

The Council has prevailed over the Parliament in almost all relevant points. This reform missed the opportunity to put EU asylum policy on the right track. Instead, bureaucratic procedures and tougher asylum laws will now suddenly deter people from fleeing to Europe. This approach has already failed in recent years. We now face the threat of more irregular migration and a culture of disintegration towards people seeking protection. This policy of deterrence is obviously not weakening right-wing populism, but rather strengthening it. 

Detention-like conditions

A system is being created in which many people are to be locked up in detention-like conditions during their asylum procedures, a lot of additional bureaucracy is being created and significantly longer asylum procedures are threatened. The new solidarity mechanism will not be able to compensate for the additional chaos and suffering this will cause.

Many important details have simply not yet been finalized. There was not enough time to negotiate all the articles. Due to the political requirement to achieve a result by the end of the year, the content was subordinated to the goal of reaching a quick agreement. This is not how legislation should take place.

Particularly in the polarized debate on asylum policy, Europe deserves the Council and Parliament to be well rested and not to decide on key points in late-night meetings that leave many questions unanswered.

Scope for improvement

Parliament and the Council still have to vote on the legal acts. We will then work to ensure that the legal acts are implemented as sensibly as possible. In addition, it is now all the more important to use the scope for improvements beyond the current reform, as it contains many loopholes. 

Questions of integration, cooperation with third countries or labor migration play no role in the current asylum reform. We will continue to fight for binding distribution, better standards at the external borders and efficient asylum procedures. This is the only way to achieve a fair distribution of responsibility for the major challenges of asylum and migration policy. In addition, human rights and the Geneva Convention on Refugees must continue to apply in Europe. It is too early today to call a swan song for the right of asylum, even if this is not a good day for the right of asylum.

Humanitarian aid for Syria

Erik Marquardt on November 24, 2023

Children in a camp in Idlib, Syria. Photo by Ahmed Akacha via Pexels.

Civil war has been raging in Syria since 2011, with almost three quarters of the population dependent on humanitarian aid as a result. The situation has deteriorated even further this year following the devastating earthquake in February, which affected almost 8.8 million people. The conflict also continues. As recently as October, the Syrian government once again Air strikes against Idlib and western Aleppo which led to 50 deaths and over 70,000 displacements and caused considerable damage to infrastructure.â The European Commission is providing relevant sums for humanitarian aid in Syria via DG ECHO. However, there are always doubts as to whether the aid deliveries are actually reaching the people who need them most urgently or are rather playing into the hands of Assad and his troops and what role sanctions are playing in this.

Highest number of fugitives in the world

The civil war in Syria has become one of the largest refugee movements worldwide: 6.8 million Syrians have left the country, mostly to neighboring countries. A further 6.7 million have been displaced within the country over the past twelve years of civil war. Half of the Syrian population is therefore fleeing war and persecution, and a safe return is still unthinkable. The proportion of Syrians in the global number of refugees is 20%.

Humanitarian situation

On June 14 and 15, 2023, the 7th Brussels Conference in Support of Syria and the Region took place. In addition to the UN, the EU institutions, 57 countries and over 30 international organizations took part. A total of €4.6 billion was pledged for 2023 and a further €1 billion for 2024. The conference is the most important donor conference for Syria and the region. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, the EU and its member states have contributed almost 30 billion the largest donors for Syria and the region.

9 out of 10 Syrians live in poverty, 12.4 million people are affected by food insecurity. People can barely afford even basic foodstuffs because prices have risen by 800% in the last two years. The north of Syria is also suffering from massive Drinking water shortage and contamination. There are many reasons for this. For example, droughts caused by climate change have led to historic low water levels in the Euphrates and other rivers, and wells have dried up. In addition, armed troops sometimes obstruct access to springs. Poor wastewater management leads to drinking water pollution and Cholera scone. 

Border crossings in northwest Syria

A fundamental problem in Syria is access to the regions that are not under the control of the Assad regime, particularly in the north of the country. Thanks to an agreement with the Syrian government, aid deliveries for the north-west of Syria were able to cross the Bab al-Hawa border crossing in September of this year. be resumed. Russia had previously announced the extension of the opening of the border post with Turkey on July 11, 2023 with a Veto in the Security Council blocked by the United Nations. The border post was established by the Security Council in 2014 and has had to be extended every 6 months since then. In the rebel-held area, 90% of the 4.5 million inhabitants are dependent on humanitarian aid.

The crossing is therefore essential for supplying the population in north-western Syria with food and medicine, among other things. In addition to the Bab al-Hawa border crossing, the openings of the crossings in Bab al-Salam and Al-Raâee, which could be used again after the earthquake in February, have also been extended. However, only around 20 % of the aid convoys reach the region via the latter. Assad's ally Russia is trying to exert pressure on the rebel areas and increase Assad's influence through repeated blockades in the Security Council. The EU has rightly spoken out against this approach in the past Critically evaluatedas it massively restricts the provision of humanitarian aid to the many people in need.

Approach by Erdogan and the Arab League to Assad

The Turkey and Syria have been slowly approaching each other again since the winter of 2022. At the same time, Turkey is continuing airstrikes on Kurdish targets in northern Syria, which are also destroying civilian infrastructure. A rapid normalization of relations is considered unlikely, as the central objectives do not appear to be compatible. Turkey and Erdogan want more Syrian refugees to return to Syria, but Assad is resisting this. He would like to recapture all areas still held by rebels if possible, whereas Turkey does not want to lose its influence in northern Syria and fears new migration movements in the event of a regime offensive. 

Assad was recently reinstated after twelve years. Arab League admitted and took part in its summit in Saudi Arabia in May. The member states of the Arab League hope that the resumption will lead to greater stability in the region. At the same time, there is talk that Assad's resumption is linked to conditions that are not public. Informal sources say that Assad has been promised investment by Arab states in the reconstruction of Syria if, in return, he allows many of the Syrians who have fled to live in Syria again, initiates a reconciliation process and stops producing the drug "Captagon". The EU in April 2023 Sanction measures imposed. In contrast to other confederations of states, the EU No sufficient reasons for movement for a normalization of relations with Syria. This also means that development cooperation remains suspended.

Misuse of humanitarian aid in Syria

Most of the money that the EU provides for Syria goes directly to UN organizations working on the ground. After the devastating earthquake at the beginning of February, there was information for the first time that the UN might open an office in the rebel-held Northwest Syria could open upbut this has not happened so far. Instead, aid has so far been coordinated via offices in areas under the control of the Syrian regime or in Turkey. In the past, there have been repeated allegations that the Assad regime UN organizations prescribes where aid may be providedunder threat of otherwise withdrawing visas. There were also accusations against the United Nations in February, when aid for the areas worst affected by the earthquake was very slow to arrive and the population was left to fend for themselves for days. Assad and his regime had repeatedly denied the Access to rebel areas preventedto starve the population and force the rebels to surrender.

Assad controls aid

Since the earthquake, Assad and Putin have repeatedly presented international sanctions as the main obstacle to humanitarian aid, which is explicitly excluded from all sanctions regimes. After a comprehensive Study by Natasha HallThe Assad regime has set up the aid structures in such a way that they are under its sole control. Almost all international organizations and aid facilities must be under the supervision of the "Syrian Arab Red Crescent" and the "Syria Trust for Development". This allows the regime to control and misappropriate aid organizations and the flow of aid across the board. In addition, the regime repeatedly abuses the exchange rate mechanism and changes it so that it can pocket large amounts of financial aid or allocate it to loyal supporters.

Recommendations for action Humanitarian aid in Syria

A large proportion of the people in Syria are dependent on humanitarian aid. However, relief supplies and financial aid may not be brought to Syria or distributed in Syria with contractual partners who have already been involved in Misappropriations involved or are under the direct control of the Assad regime. In addition, civil society should be more involved in the process of allocating humanitarian aid. Independent and local civil society organizations must be supported financially and technically to a greater extent. The inclusion of Refugee-led organizations (RLOs) can make a major contribution to this. 

Tying aid to conditions

Early recovery, i.e. humanitarian aid that also focuses on longer-term strategies to improve the situation on the ground, is also a sensible approach in a long-standing conflict. However, it is important that this is linked to strict conditions. These include a principled and conflict-sensitive approach, ongoing independent monitoring and accountability, local ownership and a „whole of Syria approach“.

In order to counter situations such as the one in the Rukban refugee camp (north-west Syria, Daraa province), where thousands of Syrians have been stranded in the desert on the Jordanian border for years without access to medical care and humanitarian aid, it must be possible to provide aid on a permanent basis, without the consent of the regime or a UN mandate and without uncertainty about the opening of border crossings. The EU must also use all diplomatic means to achieve this.

Frontex shows no interest in Crotone reconnaissance

Erik Marquardt on September 8, 2023

From joint research by Lighthouse Reports, El País, Sky News, Le Monde, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Domani, it emerges that the Italian government lied about its role in the Crotone boat accident that killed 94 people, including 35 children, and that Frontex helped cover up the incident. I sent a question to the Commission with 25 MEPs from four political groups, which was answered on August 3.

No interest in clarification

Now Frontex has also responded to our question. Specifically, we asked:

What is Frontex's assessment of the revelations, especially in light of the fact that they are not in line with the information provided before the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs statements made by its Executive Director, Hans Leijtens, on May 23, 2023. be in harmony?

Unfortunately, Frontex's answer does not show much interest in a reappraisal. The Executive Director only claims that the ship was not in an emergency situation when it was sighted by Frontex six hours before the incident. He also claims that Frontex correctly informed the Italian authorities.

Information is also withheld from the press

Frontex also refuses to to provide the press with relevant information about the case. So far, the agency has published only one e-mail, which was sent immediately after the accident. Dozens of other documents remain under lock and key. Frontex justifies this by saying that it is important information on ongoing operations. In addition, the agency claims the information could be used by smugglers. These arguments are not very convincing, because smugglers do not primarily act according to where Frontex happens to be. The clarification of the accident that led to so many deaths should have priority here.

EU migration agreement with Tunisia

Erik Marquardt on August 24, 2023

On July 16, 2023, the European Commission adopted, without consulting the Council and the European Parliament, a migration agreement (âmemorandum of understandingâ) signed with Tunisia. What is wrong with this and why human rights are not in the foreground in this deal, I have among other things explained in the NDR and I would like to explain this once again in detail in this article.

Current situation in Tunisia

Under Acting President Kais Saied, a massive dismantling of democracy in Tunisia. Saied spreads racist slogans, makes blacks the scapegoats of the economic problems in his country, and spreads the right-wing conspiracy theory of the âgreat exchangeâ, claiming that there is a plot afoot, „to change the demographic composition of Tunisia“. This agitation culminated in hunts and pogrom-like riots against black people in Tunisia. 

In the meantime, Tunisian authorities seem to have increasingly systematically abandoned people in the desert and left them to fend for themselves. Thus, only recently a group of over 80 people rescued by Libyan border guardspreviously released by Tunisia in the desert. In the desert of North Africa more people may die than on the Mediterranean SeaHowever, there is much less documented – coordinated rescue missions in the desert do not exist.

According to UNHCR figures Tunisia has replaced Libya as the largest transit country since last year. Since the beginning of 2023 A total of 104,808 protection seekers arrived in Italy by sea. According to Tunisian National Guard data 34,290 people were prevented from fleeing Tunisia from January to the end of June 2023, nearly four times more than in the same period in 2022.

At the same time, the situation for refugees in Tunisia is very bad. There is no functioning asylum system and no other legal framework to protect asylum seekers or to grant residence permits.

Migration cooperation with Tunisia to date 

There is a longstanding cooperation between Tunisia and the EU in the field of migration. In 2012, a Privileged Partnership was established and an Action Plan for the period 2013 to 2017 was adopted. The action plan addressed the protection of asylum seekers and refugees as well as cooperation in the areas of migration, mobility, and security. In parallel, in 2014, a Mobility partnership was established. This should lead to the conclusion of two agreements: the first on readmission and a second on the facilitation of visa formalities.

Negotiations for a readmission agreement between the EU and Tunisia began in 2016. Tunisia has signed and generally respected bilateral readmission agreements with six member states (including Italy, Germany, and Belgium), but they are limited to Tunisian nationals. 

Even the 1998 readmission agreement with Italy, which provides for the repatriation of foreigners, excludes the readmission of third-country nationals from member states of the Arab Maghreb Union to Tunisia.

Already in 2017, Tunisia had rejected the EU’s proposals to âoutsourceâ migration management; Saied also emphasized that Tunisia does not want to become âEurope’s border guardâ. However, the EU has been financing migration measures (for border control) in Tunisia for years, among others through EU Trust Fund for Africa (expiring) and through NDICI – Global Europe. There, the âMulti-countryâ Migration Program for the Southern Neighborhood 2021-2027 2021 allocated 25 million euros to support the development of border management facilities. In particular, for the support of the training infrastructure of the Tunisian Guard Nationale Maritime, support for the establishment of a coordination center for sea rescue and completion of the integrated coastal surveillance system. In addition, EUR 14 million was allocated in 2021 to support the return of Tunisians. Here is a detailed report to this. 

The content of the âdeclaration of intentâ

On June 11, at a Press conference Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (as âTeam Europeâ) presented the planned package of measures during a visit to Tunis, preceded by several visits by various representatives of the EU and its member states in the months before. Von der Leyen underscored the historic partnership between the EU and Tunisia and emphasized the intention to work with Tunisia on a âcomprehensive packageâ that would focus on 5 pillars supports: 

  1. Support economic development Mobilization of up to ⬠900 million for macro-financial assistance (linked to IMF criteria/ IMF loan of 1.9 billion), plus ⬠150 million in immediate budget support (funds that flow directly into the state budget).
  2. Investment and trade – Modernization trade agreements, investment in digital infrastructure etc.
  3. Energy – Production and export of renewable energy (including ELMED cable).
  4. Migration Support for border management and anti-smuggling, sea rescue and repatriation, for which the EU budget will provide â'¬ 105 million in 2023.
  5. âPeople to people contactsâ/ People communication – Measures for exchange and cooperation such as Erasmus+, in the research field, vocational training measures, etc. 

On July 16, the corresponding Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed, which takes up and deepens the above points. The legal status of the MoU is not clear, and the parliament was not involved, which would have been necessary if it were an agreement.

Macrofinancial support

The text does not provide any specific figures on macrofinancial support; more detailed information will be discussed in the third quarter â23.

With regard to cooperation in the field of migration, the following points are primarily mentioned:

  • Irregular migration is to be combated (in line with previous cooperation in the areas of border protection, support for the Tunisian coast guard, combating smuggling), and legal migration routes are to be opened up.
  • Tunisia to be supported in deporting third-country nationals ("irregular migrants") to their countries of origin
  • Development cooperation should aim at combating the causes of flight (e.g. through training measures)
  • Saied's position, already expressed in advance, that Tunisia is not a "host country" and that no border protection is carried out beyond its own borders is reiterated
  • Return measures from the EU refer only to Tunisian nationals, not third-country nationals
  • the EU should support Tunisia in concluding similar bilateral agreements with member states 
  • for all these measures financial support is provided by the EU 

The extent to which these points from the MoU are implemented in practice, what implications they have for the human rights situation in Tunisia, or what priorities are set, cannot yet be answered. There has been no impact assessment with regard to fundamental and human rights, nor has there been an impact assessment with regard to the question of whether the intended goals can be achieved with the corresponding measures.

The further procedure 

According to Article 218 TFEU, international treaties concluded by the EU with third countries require the consent of the European Parliament. A "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed here by the Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy Olivér Várhelyi and the Tunisian Foreign Minister Mounir Ben Rijba. The individual points are then to be implemented in different procedures. In the Interior Committee of the European Parliament on 18.07.23 members of various parliamentary groups have articulated clear doubts and called for a legal opinion to clarify the legal nature of the agreement. This is particularly relevant because it is unclear which decision-making structures will be applied at all and what role Parliament will have in this process.

Also from the Council Legal Service, the European External Action Service, and numerous member state there is said to have been vehement criticismthat the agreement was signed without their consultation, legal action was reserved.
The announced macro-financial assistance of up to €900 million retains, according to so far informal information from the Commission, a successful agreement with the IMF as a precondition and also requires a legal act of the Council and the EP (ordinary legislative procedure). The additionally announced budget support and other measures can be funded from the 2023 budget via various financing instruments, whereby the EP has no formal role in deciding on the specific allocation of funds. However, the procedure and the allocation of funds have so far been so opaque that it is not yet possible to make a final assessment.

Rating 

Most of the measures in the MoU are not new, nor do they represent a U-turn in cooperation between the EU and Tunisia or the entire southern neighborhood. It is also important that the EU does not turn its back on the Tunisian people, and many of the announced measures, such as the exchange on the inclusion of Tunisia in the Erasmus+ program, are to be supported. However, the de facto linking of financial support against cooperation in the migration sector is critical. Even though according to the MoU human rights standards are to be respected, this is not further defined, and a human rights impact assessment is not foreseen. Experience in Libya, for example, shows that without concrete measures and law enforcement in this area, massive human rights violations can go unpunished in practice, and they also have no influence on the funding of cooperation. It is also questionable how compliance with these standards will be verified if we are already failing with them at our own external borders. The largely unconditional cooperation in the area of migration and the allocation of funds (especially budget support directly for the state budget) without clearly defined conditions send a devastating signal. This is especially true as democratic structures are increasingly dismantled in Tunisia and basic rights of refugees in the country are not respected. The EU ("Team Europe") is obviously trying by all means to stop migration movements, although many of those seeking protection would be entitled to asylum in the EU. In particular, partners in third countries are used, because they want to achieve things that the EU states themselves are not allowed to do under human rights law – for example, disembarking shipwrecked asylum seekers in Tunisia.


In my view, one of the main criticisms of the agreement is the planned support of Tunisia in the repatriation of "irregular migrants" to their countries of origin, while at the same time a national asylum law has not been implemented in Tunisia and thus all procedures lie with the UNHCR. Instead of investing money in (ineffective) border protection and supporting an autocratic regime, efforts should rather be made to create a binding legal framework and adequate structures for protection seekers in Tunisia.

Overall, the opportunity to reach a transparent and progressive agreement that achieves a sustainable improvement in the human rights situation in Tunisia, creates legal migration channels and a joint partnership that could help end the deaths on the Mediterranean Sea has been missed here so far. While some points from the agreement are welcome, it remains to be seen whether these points will actually be implemented, as many points from such agreements have not been implemented in the past once the money-for-migration deal has worked.

Migration agreements should be discussed in parliaments and negotiated transparently. In recent years, however, governments and the EU Commission have increasingly shunned parliaments and the public when new deals are being negotiated. Where this leads has been shown in the failed EU-Turkey deal and in Libya, where, according to the UN Commission, we are now supporting smuggling structures with taxpayer money. This kind of thing should not happen again in Tunisia, but it is happening now.

One should not transfer hundreds of millions to an autocrat without having a clear plan. Tunisian President Kais Saied is engaged in a massive dismantling of democracy, spreading conspiracy theories and stirring up racist sentiment. With this deal, the EU is not only supporting an autocrat, it is also making itself vulnerable to blackmail from him. In recent weeks, evidence has mounted that Tunisia is simply abandoning refugees in the desert without water or food. Those responsible in Tunisia are accepting the death of people on the run. The EU strategy is short-sighted and naive, they believe they can buy their way out of responsibility with money. European asylum policy should not be dependent on a right-wing populist government in Italy and its good contacts with an autocrat in Tunisia. 

Question: Human trafficking by Libyan coast guard

Erik Marquardt on August 23, 2023

European Union and Libya. The concept of relationship between EU and Libya.

I have asked the Commission what it thinks about the fact that the Libyan coast guard, which it supports, is itself involved in smuggling and human trafficking. This includes a person who is on the sanctions list of the United Nations Security Council. 

In its response, the Commission says that the human rights violations and conditions in detention centers in Libya are unacceptable. Nevertheless, the Commission supports the very entities that bring people to these camps. So the Commission knows that basic human rights are being violated here, but is not willing to align its policy with these basic human rights. The Commission talks about saving lives, but in most cases these are not rescue operations, but pull-backs, in which people are taken against their will to the civil war country Libya, so that they do not apply for asylum in the EU. 

The reference to the fact that the people in Libya would be even worse off without EU aid is a red herring, since my question is not about cooperation in general, but very specifically about the Libyan coast guard. The Commission’s claim that there is a “solid monitoring mechanism†is wishful thinking. The Commission supports an organization that, according to the UN, violates basic human rights and believes that it can give money to this organization without supporting the violation of basic human rights. In addition, there is a massive lack of transparency towards the parliament, because evaluations and monitoring are not disclosed. Despite repeated requests, we MEPs do not have a precise overview of the EU funds for Libya.

All my questions and the answers of the Commission can be found here.

My request

From the recent report of the independent fact-finding mission of the United Nations Human Rights Council. on Libya reveals evidence that units and members of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard are collaborating with smugglers and are themselves involved in human trafficking, particularly in the western Libyan region of Zawiya. It has been revealed that the Libyan Coast Guard in this area is in cahoots with the al-Nasr detention center in Zawiya. The unit’s commander, Abd al-Rahman al-Milad (nicknamed âBijaâ), has been on trial since June 2018 for involvement in human trafficking. United Nations Security Council Sanctions List.

1) When did the Commission learn about this and what information does it have about this collusion in the Zawiya region?

2) What action will the Commission take in response to the findings that have come to light and will this result in the cessation of cooperation with or financial support for the so-called Libyan Coast Guard? 3) What steps can we expect the Commission to take after the publication of this report with regard to Italy in light of the country’s cooperation with Libya and the so-called Libyan Coast Guard?

Answer given by Olivér Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission (21.8.2023)

Given the complex situation in Libya, EU-funded programs in Libya are implemented according to the principle of harm reduction and with a conflict-sensitive and rights-based approach, ensuring respect for human rights and due diligence as well as restrictive measures. The Commission pays close attention to ensuring that individuals working on ther Sanctions List of the United Nations Security Council will not benefit from EU funds. EU and Italian support for the Libyan coast guard plays a crucial role in saving lives at sea. The human rights violations in Libya and the conditions in the detention centers are unacceptable.

In line with the strategic guidelines of the European Council, the Commission continues to work with the Libyan authorities to build capacity for effective border management, in line with international standards and respect for human rights, to save lives at sea and to combat smuggling and trafficking networks. Despite the difficult situation in Libya, the situation of those most in need would not improve if EU assistance in the country were to be temporarily suspended or if the EU were to withdraw from the country altogether.

The EU, together with its implementing partners, has a robust monitoring mechanism for the assistance provided to Libya. Third party monitoring is also carried out, focusing in particular on compliance with the harm reduction principle. Furthermore, the Commission carries out ad hoc evaluation and monitoring missions. As regards the provision of search and rescue vessels to the Libyan coast guard, the delivery followed the signing of an agreement between Italy and Libya, which includes guarantees for the respect of human rights and the monitoring of the use of the vessels.

5 billion € of the EU to Greece for migration and asylum – and still such conditions?

Erik Marquardt on August 22, 2023

Since 2014, the European Union has provided a total of €4.96 billion to Greece to address migration and border challenges.

The European Union's support to Greece is provided through four pots: the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), the Internal Security Fund (ISF), the  Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) and the Border Management and Visa Policy Instrument (BMVI). The largest pot is the AMIF, through which a total of €9.88 billion has been made available in the current Multiannual Financial Framework. Greece has been allocated €2.75 billion from this pot since 2014. Through this budget item, EU member states are supported for the purpose of the efficient management of migration and the implementation and strengthening of the Common European Asylum System. The ISF provides money for the management of visas and entry, control of external borders, but also returns, for example through Frontex. Here, nearly half a billion € has been provided to Greece since 2014. The ESI is used to support emergencies and gives money for humanitarian aid, the share was €668.9 million. The BMVI has the task of ensuring European border protection at the external borders of the Union. Most of the regular money from AMIF, ISF, ESI and BMVI goes to the national authorities, i.e. the Greek authorities dealing with migration and asylum, such as the Greek Ministry of Migration and Asylum. 

In addition to the regular requirements, funds can also be mobilized from AMIF and ISF for other short-term emergency needs ("Emergency Assistance"). In the case of Greece, the funds disbursed between 2014 and 2020 from Emergency Assistance represent the largest sum of all funds, in total 2,07 € billion. 1.25 € billion of all funds of the Emergency Assistance 820 million went to international organizations and €820 million to the Greek authorities.

How much money has actually flowed?

In fact the Greek authorities received 2.59 € billion, under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) from 2014 to 2020. In this context, it is particularly important to note that 3.38 € billion awarded were made, but a large part of it was not spent. This clearly shows that the funds available are necessary to provide adequate and dignified care for refugees on the Greek islands and on the mainland, but the political will is missingto implement it in this way. 

Basic requirements of the EU Reception Directive are still not being met in Greece, such as the right to education for children. The provision of food is also still problematic and inadequate. Enough money would actually be available to solve the problems in the long term. Even the European Court of Auditors as the EU's own authority, came in its Annual Report 2019 reached similar conclusions, without explicitly naming them as such. There was no explicit misappropriation of funds, but some funds from Emergency Assistance were misappropriated for longer-term projects and structures, although they may only be used flexibly for short-term emergency needs. In addition, the ACA criticized the inefficient use of the funds and thus the Discrepancy between EU targets and actual results – in other words, the lack of political will. Now, the money is not only going to the Greek authorities, but also to international organisations. But even more money to international organisations is not necessarily helpful if the Greek government does not support their work. blocked and criminalized, as is the case especially on the Greek islands. 

For those who would like to take a closer look at the money budgeted and flowed and the MFF 2014-2020, you can find here is an overview from the European Commission. It also presents how much money went to the different international organization as well as to which Greek authorities. 

A consideration of the Numbers makes one thing very clear again. Almost €5 billion has been allocated to Greece for migration and asylum since the summer of migration in 2015. The state authorities and organizations actually have enough resources to treat and care for people with dignity. But it seems politically undesirable. How much money will actually be drawn down under the current financial framework remains to be seen.

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