Five years of the EU-Turkey deal: How time was bought and not used

Five years ago, the European Council and the Commission agreed with Turkey on on a deal. 

The deal was meant to prevent people from Turkey from fleeing to Europe in greater numbers. The zenith of the 2015 crisis, in which hundreds of thousands came to Europe, had long since been exceeded and the arrival figures have already dropped significantly. Nevertheless, the aim was to prevent people from continuing to flee to Europe via Turkey. 

The deal was a precedent for a policy that seeks to externalise the EU's borders: The border to the EU should no longer be at the EU's external borders, but already in Turkey or North Africa. The heads of state have not yet been able to agree on a robust asylum system for the EU. The only thing they have agreed on so far is that people should be stopped outside the EU, and those who do arrive are often housed in inhumane mass camps like Moria.

What was agreed in the EU-Turkey deal?

Turkey agreed to take measures to prevent irregular migration. In return the country was promised billions in aid. The deal also stipulated that Syrian refugees who nevertheless reached the Greek islands irregularly from Turkey would be returned to Turkey. For each person returned, one person who had fled Syria was to be resettled from Turkey to the EU. This part of the deal was never actually implemented. Between the first quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2020, approximately 27,000 Syrian refugees were resettled from all over Turkey to EU countries. Especially in the last year, hardly any people were resettled. So in recent years, less than 1% of Syrian refugees in Turkey have had the opportunity to come to Europe legally.

In return for the prevention of flight from Turkey, Ankara was also to receive accelerated visa facilitation for its citizens. However, these visa facilitations do not exist until today, to which Turkey regularly refers. In fact, Turkey has never met all the conditions for visa facilitation. However, since complying with the rules was not realistic even five years ago, one can assume that Turkey expects the facilitations as a bonus away from the usual procedure.

The most important and expensive point of the agreement was the payment of a total of 6 billion euros for various projects to support Syrian refugees in Turkey. Contrary to some claims, the money was actually flowing and much of it had already arrived. 


The commitments made at the time show, above all, that the Heads of State and Government were prepared to make very large concessions in order for the deal to take effect. The European Parliament was not involved in the negotiation of the deal. 

Legally questionable decisions

The decisions to implement the EU-Turkey deal were already legally questionable. The Greek government under Alexis Tsipras at the time was pressured into pushing a bad law through its parliament so that the deal could be implemented. Greece recognised Turkey as a "safe third countryso that it is easier to deport people there. At the same time, thousands of people have fled and are still fleeing from Turkey itself due to political persecution. Turkey is not only not a safe country for all refugees. It is not even a safe country for many of its own citizens. Greece had little choice at the time, as they were threatened that closing the northern Macedonian border would leave them alone with the refugees crossing Europe.

By returning Syrians to Turkey, the EU is also supporting a policy that ultimately amounts to deportations to Syria, because it expects Turkey to "take all necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes from opening up to illegal migration“".

In the meantime, European authorities are systematically pushing people from Greece to Turkey or deporting them illegally. This is an attempt to reduce dependence on Turkey at the expense of human rights and dignity and to decimate the number of people seeking protection in Europe.  In Turkey, on the other hand, war refugees from Syria are threatened with deportation to their home country. This is life-threatening for many. The people are not only threatened by the acts of war, but also by the torture prisons of the Assad regime, in which tens of thousands of people disappeared. Among them also people, who returned to Syria, or forced to return. 

The fact that fewer people are actually coming at the moment is not just because of the EU-Turkey deal. It is because of the pandemic and the systematic pushback by the Greek authorities. Fewer people are not coming because of the deal, but because EU states are trampling fundamental human rights underfoot.

As a result of the deal, Turkey also sealed off the Syrian border, so the EU-Turkey deal also contributed to making it increasingly difficult to flee the Syrian civil war.

Europe makes itself vulnerable to blackmail 

In the last five years, Turkey has witnessed the European Union's capacity for blackmail on many occasions. Turkey has imprisoned opposition activists and journalists, marched with German Leopard-2 tanks in Syria and is fighting minorities in its own country. Particularly with regard to the invasion of Syria, many EU officials have been silent. Criticism of serious human rights violations is voiced, but it rarely has real political consequences, for fear that Turkey could open the borders to Greece and Bulgaria. 

The fact that the European Union still did not have a robust asylum system based on the rule of law, years after it bought itself time with the Turkey deal, took its revenge in March 2020. I myself experienced this on the ground in Lesbos a year ago. 

After Erdoğan announced an opening of the border and suddenly there were several thousand people at the external border, Greece reacted with force and simply suspended the fundamental right to asylum. That was unlawful. The Greek coast guard started shooting in the direction of rubber dinghies full of people instead of rescuing them. Boats were left in distress for hours instead of intervening immediately. A girl drowned while trying to get to Lesbos, although they could have been saved. The Greek police fired live ammunition at people and very likely killed several people in the process, for example Muhammad Gulzar. 

These actions were justified at the time with military rhetoric. The President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, described Greece as a "Protective Shield of Europe." 

The government in Ankara realised very well at the time that it could blackmail the EU by allowing a few thousand people to cross towards the EU border or even taking them there in buses. It's no wonder that on the international stage no one takes seriously a community of states that allows itself to be blackmailed by the arrival of refugees on a few rubber dinghies. 

In the EU, they try to justify this policy because they are afraid of a new 2015. But the many millions of people who are sitting on packed suitcases in Turkey to come to the EU don't exist. When Erdoğan opened the borders a year ago, not hundreds of thousands came, but only a few thousand. Among them, hardly anyone was from Syria, although Turkey is home to more than 3.5 million Syrians. Most of the refugees in Turkey live near the Syrian border. They wish to return or have settled in Turkey in recent years. Many have learned the language and found work. Most of these people do not want to go to the EU at all. 

Not everything is bad about the deal

Not everything about the deal is bad. And of course it's good for the EU to help refugees in Turkey. The EU-Turkey deal contains a list of important commitments, some of which are good and necessary. These include financial support to give Syrian refugees access to education, healthcare and the labour market. It has been made easier to allocate the funds needed for this purpose. Much of the pledged six billion euros has been launched in the meantime. 

With these funds, hundreds of thousands of children from Syria were able to attend school, people were able to see a doctor or were helped to learn the language. Much of the money went directly to aid organizations, even though the Turkish government pushed for more money to be transferred to government agencies in Turkey. Nor should the funding of the Turkish Ministry of Health and Education be condemned per se.

One of the problems with the deal, however, is that the lack of parliamentary oversight and accountability means it is not clear which projects have been successful and how.

Unfortunately, some sensible aspects of the EU-Turkey deal, such as the creation of legal escape routes, have not been adequately implemented. And despite the money from the EU, the reception conditions for refugees often do not meet humanitarian standards and real access to state services or the labour market exists for many only on paper, but not in reality. 

And what was to come next?

There is a lot of talk about the causes of flight, but they are rarely the focus of action. Instead, European asylum policy is too often shaped by short-term goals. For a future agreement, it would make sense to keep the promises of legal escape routes and redistribution and to focus on the causes of flight from Turkey instead of dysfunctional return mechanisms. The aim must be that people who have fled to Turkey do not have to flee to Europe first in order to finally be safe. However, we will not achieve this by violating human rights at the external borders, but by supporting Turkey in creating prospects for refugees. 

That is why the successful programmes in Turkey should be continued and expanded. It would be important that they not only reach people from Syria, but also the many hundreds of thousands of other refugees who come from Afghanistan, for example. One has bought time with the deal as Europe above all at the expense of human rights. Tragically, this time has not been used, but five years later the situation is worse than before: human rights violations at the external borders have now become systematic and the mass camps at the external borders serve more as a deterrent than as humane accommodation for those seeking protection. Nor has a system for the redistribution of protection seekers in the EU or the creation of legal escape routes been achieved since 2016. According to UN figures, the number of refugees worldwide has risen by around 15 million people in the last five years, despite all protestations about combating the causes of flight.

These legal migration possibilities to the EU exist

There are too few legal migration opportunities to the EU. This is a particular problem for refugees, who often have to risk their lives to apply for asylum. 

Because the EU fails to create legal escape and migration routes, people die trying to reach Europe. The EU's externalisation policy is designed to prevent people from entering European soil well before Europe's borders. This makes it very difficult for those seeking protection to apply for asylum in the EU. Despite some assurances to create increased opportunities for legal entry, little has been done in this regard. In the following, I will explain the options available to people who want to migrate legally to the EU. 

In principle, there is the possibility to enter with the "EU Blue Card" or a valid visa. Those who do not have a valid visa or the EU Blue Card can apply for asylum. 

In the year 2019 2.9 million people from third countries were granted residence permits. 41% of them obtained a work permit, 27% came to the EU for family reasons and 14% of people for educational purposes. In addition, there were 631 579 asylum applications. Legal migration accounts for the largest share of migration to the EU. In contrast, the number of illegalised border crossings is only 141 700 cases.  

In migration policy, the EU and the Member States share some responsibilities, which makes it difficult to introduce EU-wide rules on migration. While the EU can set entry requirements and residence conditions for people from third countries, it is up to the member states to implement them. They can determine how many people from third countries they grant entry and work permits to. The EU can promote the admission and integration of third-country nationals through appropriate frameworks and incentives, but national rules apply. 

The EU Blue Card 

The EU blue card was introduced in 2008 and adapted in 2017 after some shortcomings. This accelerated procedure is intended to create attractive conditions for highly qualified third-country nationals. Highly qualified persons with a university degree and an employment contract in Germany with a minimum annual income of €50,800 can enter the EU and work here with the EU Blue Card; the same applies to highly qualified persons from an area where there is a shortage of skilled workers in the EU with an employment contract with a minimum annual salary of €39,624.
More information on the Blue Card can be found at Infomigrants and in the Visaguide.

Visas

Who has a valid Visa can enter the country by plane and check in after the Schengen Borders Code move within the Schengen area. In this case, a request for asylum can be expressed orally. Those who were able to enter without a valid passport must go through an airport procedure by the police in the transit area. In the case of a refusal, an entry ban is issued. This can be appealed against. If the airport procedure or an objection lodged against it is positive, an asylum procedure is initiated.

Humanitarian visas

In addition, Member States may issue humanitarian visas to people who are not yet recognised as refugees. These can legally enter the Member State and apply for asylum here. A common European framework for this does not yet exist.

In the case of positively decided asylum applications within the meaning of the Geneva Refugee Commission or subsidiary protection, people can be relocated from one Member State to another. Here, people who have been granted international protection are entitled to similar rights as in the country of first entry. This procedure is known as Relocation known.  

An overview of the possibilities for persons seeking protection in Germany to obtain a residence permit can be found at here. Infomigrants describes the legal migration possibilities to the EU in English.

Labour migration

For the highly qualified, students and scientists, seasonal workers and people moving within companies, there are legal guidelines to facilitate migration. 

For the approximately 100,000 seasonal workers:inside in the EU regulates the Directive 2014/36/EU  the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals. These are particularly employed in the tourism and agricultural sectors. They may legally reside in the EU for a period of between five and nine months in order to work seasonally. During this period, however, their main place of residence must also be in the third country in question. 

The Directive 2014/66/EU regulates the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of a intragroup transfers. Anyone employed outside the EU in an international company can be transferred to a branch or subsidiary within the EU. 

For international trainees, students and scientists, and for Exchange students and volunteers, au pairs and educational travellers applies the Directive (EU) 2016/801. This allows students and academics to remain in the EU for a further nine months after completing their studies or research in order to find work or set up a business. Researchers are also allowed to bring family members to the EU. In the programme Erasmus+ non-EU citizens can also participate. 

Family reunion

If a family member is already legally residing in the EU, family members may join them. The Directive 2003/86/EC sets the framework for this. Thus, spouses, minor children and the children of the spouse may join them. Member States may also allow the reunification of unmarried partners, adult children and dependent parents and grandparents. The reunited family members will receive a residence permit corresponding to the already migrated family member and can apply for an independent permit after a maximum of five years. 

However, Member States may set certain criteria to authorise family reunification. For example, reunification may be linked to financial resources, suitable accommodation and health insurance, as well as "integration measures". In addition, there may be a maximum two-year waiting period. If, in the view of the authorities, there is a risk to public order, public safety or public health, the application may be rejected. Fraudulent cases such as fictitious adoption or fictitious marriage may be punished. If the applicant has been recognised as a refugee, the criteria for granting family reunification are somewhat milder. 

The regulations can be read here

Resettlement

"Resettlement means the transfer of third-country nationals in need of international protection from a third country to an EU Member State which will receive them and grant them protection."

A prerequisite for resettlement is that the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) decides that the person qualifies as a refugee under the Geneva Convention and that resettlement is the most appropriate procedure. Stateless people who do not qualify as refugees under the Geneva Convention may also be resettled. After selection by UNHCR, cases are submitted to potential host states, which decide whether to grant or refuse resettlement. The criteria of each member state and the time for resettlement vary.

Those who come to the EU under the resettlement procedure are protected against refoulement to third countries and have rights similar to those of nationals. The same applies to family members. In addition, there is the possibility of obtaining citizenship oneself. 

The European Resettlement Network explains the individual steps in the resettlement procedure and shows possibilities of obtaining a residence permit within the EU via the procedure. 

An overview of the resettlement procedure from the European Parliament's scientific service can be found at EPRS read up.

ARAPs (active refugee admission policies)

In addition, there is the possibility for states to adopt their own active policies for the reception of protection seekers. For example, new reception instruments such as private partnerships and emergency evacuations are currently being tested. Private partnerships are based on private support and funding for protection seekers. Emergency evacuations are linked to more flexible conditions than traditional resettlement procedures and are more likely to lead to temporary protection status. There is also the possibility of coming to Europe through scholarship programmes.

These ARAPS (active refugee admission policies) are voluntary. There is a risk that decisions on the admission of people in need of assistance will be based more on functional criteria than on humanitarian emergencies and that people will potentially experience discrimination. On the other hand, ARAPs can lead to protection seekers receiving protection through safe and legal channels. In addition, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides pre- and post-arrival training to promote reception and integration. 

The Escape Research Blog provides an overview of ARAPs and potential weaknesses and research gaps.

Important rights, possibilities and procedures concerning asylum in the EU can be found at here.

Anyone wishing to migrate to the EU to work, study or bring their family together can apply on the EU Immigration Portal inform 

What we demand

Legal routes to the EU need to be expanded and people need to be informed about them. We Greens call for legal and safe migration routes to the EU and flexible arrangements to facilitate family reunification and work and study within the EU for third country nationals.

We are therefore committed to the design of a EU-wide visa system for humanitarian visas a. For example, protection seekers should have more opportunities to apply for visas at embassies and consulates outside the EU so that they can enter the EU legally and safely. 

In addition, we call for a European migration code. This should protect the rights of migrants in the EU. To this end, rights within the EU must be harmonised and new and secure legal channels for migration to the EU must be created, irrespective of the migrants' qualifications and income. In particular, the rights of migrants with low incomes and low qualifications must be expanded, because the value of people is not measured in their economic usability.

There is also a need for agreements with third countries in order to avoid a brain drain in these countries. Instead, balanced partnerships should be concluded. For this, they must be decoupled from further migration control measures and readmission agreements. Partnerships could, for example, facilitate multiple entry visas and expand pilot projects.

The full position paper of the Green Group in the European Parliament on labour migration from third countries is available at here read up. 

Frontex inquiry group in the European Parliament starts its work

Today, February 23, 2021, met for the first time the Frontex investigation team of the European Parliament. It consists of 14 MEPs, of which I am one. The central question is whether the agency has systematically committed human rights violations. In four months' time, the group will present its first report. Even after the first inquiry, the group will continue to look into Frontex.

The accusations against the EU agency Frontex are serious. Greek officials are dragging masses of refugees out to sea and the agency is watching or even actively helping. This is proven by investigative research by independent media.

Frontex shows little interest in reconnaissance so far

On the other hand, there is little interest in reconnaissance at Frontex. Frontex internal documents show that the agency was trying to cover up crimes. Frontex chief Fabrice in particular Leggeri prevented the investigation... and also lied to us MEPs when he was summoned to the European Parliament. The following day, even Frontex's press department had to admit that Leggeri had lied. 

Despite the burden of proof, the Frontex Director continues to claim that he has no knowledge of these incidents and that Frontex is complying with human rights law. However, Leggeri himself has sent questions to the Member States concerned regarding human rights violations. It is therefore not credible that he knows nothing at all. 

Federal police involved in pushback

There are a large number of cases where Frontex is accused of human rights violations. For example, on August 10, 2020, a ship with a German crew stopped and pushed back an inflatable boat carrying refugees. Thus, German federal police officers are also involved in such activities. With the magazine Frontal 21 spoke a federal police officer also about the fact that officials are expected to break existing law and basic human rights. 

On the morning of 10 August 2020, at around 6 a.m., the German ship "DEU CPB 62", dispatched to Frontex, observes a rubber dinghy with about 40 people in Greek waters, not far from the island of Samos. It sails there, stops the boat and informs the Greek coast guard. The coast guard appears a few minutes later and takes over the situation. The German ship leaves the scene. The Greek coastguard's report subsequently states that the people seeking protection on the rubber dinghy had changed course and had returned to Turkish waters. When asked, the Greek officials confirmed that they had carried out "border protection measures to prevent a landing on Samos". 

Frontex observes pushback, but Leggeri does not classify it as a violation of fundamental rights

Another important case occurred on the night of 18-19 April 2020, when a Frontex reconnaissance aircraft flew over the Eastern Mediterranean and observed protection seekers on a Greek Coast Guard vessel and their empty inflatable boat being pulled by the Greek boat. Two hours later, the Frontex aircraft observes the protection seekers being returned to the inflatable boat by the Greek Coast Guard patrol boat, with another speedboat waiting in the immediate vicinity. Frontex also clearly states at this point that there are no Turkish boats in the vicinity. 
A few minutes later, at around 2.45 a.m. on 19 April 2020, the Frontex aircraft takes a picture of the Greek boat pulling the leashed inflatable boat with the protection seekers on board towards Turkish waters. Half an hour later, Frontex observes that the inflatable boat has no engine and the Greek boats move away from the vicinity of the boat. The next afternoon, Greek authorities confirm that the dinghy was spotted by the Turkish coast guard and taken to the Turkish mainland. Frontex officials reported the incident and Fabrice Leggeri turned to the Greek government, However, in the end, the court did not classify the case as a violation of fundamental rights.

Working group to be set up in the European Parliament

The European Parliament's Committee on Home Affairs has summoned Frontex on this several times, but we MEPs have simply been lied to. The committee has submitted written questions, but the answers have been rather modest.

The European Parliament's inquiry group will now examine the available evidence and procedures and answer the question of whether Frontex is disregarding its mandate, contributing to human rights violations and acting contrary to the EU's fundamental values and founding principles. After the initial inquiry, the group will continue to exist to monitor and scrutinise Frontex's activities.

Our goals in the working group

I am glad that the working group was set up on the initiative of the Greens/EFA Group. With my group colleague Tineke Strik, who is responsible for the first report, I will work in the investigation group to investigate the allegations against Frontex. Concrete Green objectives are the following: 

  • the drafting of an evidence-based report on the allegations against Frontex
  • Recommendations to Frontex to be implemented by the Agency
  • A consideration of fundamental rights in the mandates of the Agency
  • Changing the working culture at Frontex
  • Transparent reporting by Frontex to the public and to the European Parliament, to which it is accountable. 
  • an ongoing, transparent review of the work of Frontex 

What happens to money that the EU provides to Bosnia and Herzegovina for refugees?

Since the beginning of 2018, the EU has provided Bosnia and Herzegovina with a total of around €89 million for flight and migration. With the money should, according to the EU Commission provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and support the Bosnian authorities in migration management. 

Of this money, over €75 million came from the so-called Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). This is pre-accession assistance from the EU to promote reforms in potential EU accession countries. The money is intended to help countries become fit for the EU. A further €13.8 million came from the ECHO pot, which provides funds for emergency humanitarian aid. 

This money also includes €3.5 million made available additionally by the EU Commission at the beginning of Januaryafter the camp in Lipa burned down and hundreds of people were left homeless at the mercy of the winter in the Bosnian mountains. The money will be used for warm clothing, blankets, food and health care. The money will mainly be used to support aid organisations such as Save the Children or the Danish Refugee Council. The Danish Refugee Council, for example, used parts of the funds to important reports on the violent and illegal pushbacks through Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina to create. 


In view of the terrible situation in Bosnia, some people are now asking what happened to the money. Deutsche Welle also reported on the topic.

This is where the money goes  

However, most of the money goes to IOM in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IOM has received a total of €76.8 million from the EU since June 2018, of which €51.6 million had been drawn down by the end of 2020. This left €25.3 million at the end of the year. The IOM homepage also lists the allocation of funds. I will list the most important points here again.

On this graph you can see that a large part of the funding comes from the IPA.pot. In addition, funds for a response to Covid-19 in Bosnia and Herzegovina have also been allocated to refugees so that they are not defenceless against the virus. In view of the cramped conditions in the existing warehouses and the very close proximity of bunk beds However, it must be doubted whether this strategy of the IOM is sufficient. 

How IOM uses the funds

In this chart, IOM lists how funds have been distributed in Bosnia and Herzegovina so far. 

14 % of the funds were spent on the creation or renovation of a total of seven camps in the canton of Una-Sana and the area around Sarajevo. This includes the installation of 562 containers in the camps Ušivak, Blažuj, Lipa, Bira, Sedra, Borici and Miral, as well as the reconstruction of the former student dormitory in Borici. In addition, approximately 5900 bunk beds, over 10,000 mattresses, 1300 heaters, 45 industrial washing machines and other equipment were purchased for the camps.Approximately 2 % will be spent on IOM administration, rooms and staff in the Sarajevo and Bihać offices.

Lack of transparency in the use of funds by Bosnian authorities

At €3.4 million, around seven per cent of the money went directly to Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutions. From the money, the police received new vehicles, drones, thermal imaging cameras and heavy protective equipment for counterinsurgency. However, after seeing with my own eyes the brutality with which the Canton police crack down on refugees, I have doubts about whether this is really the best use for the funds. In addition, the funds are being used to finance 25 employees of the Bosnian Foreigners Authority. 

Unfortunately, it is not possible at present to obtain a precise breakdown of the use of funds by the Bosnian authorities. The Bosnian authorities are not providing a full report on this and are ignoring enquiries from journalists. This is not a very transparent way of dealing with European taxpayers' money. 

The allocation of funds is monitored by a committee comprising representatives of the EU Delegation to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Ministry of Security, the border police, the foreigners' offices and several aid organisations. The Bosnian authorities, in particular, must explain where the money goes if they want to dispel doubts about the correct allocation of funds.

Funds for humanitarian aid

77 % of the funds spent by IOM so far went to the area of humanitarian aid. The more than € 16 million includes expenses for heating, water, garbage collection, maintenance, as well as the costs for IOM staff. IOM currently employs a total of 423 staff in the camps, 421 of whom are Bosnian nationals. 

Almost €10.9 million was spent by IOM on the distribution of more than 8.2 million meals. In doing so, IOM collaborated with the NGO Pomozi.ba in Sarajevo Canton and the Red Cross in Una-Sana Canton. 

For the purchase of goods for daily use, the IOM has spent a total of more than € 4.7 million for 1.6 million items. These are hygiene items such as soap and toothbrushes, but also sleeping bags, winter clothing or protective masks. 

Another €4.7 million was spent on health and education. This area includes medical care and transport, as well as special protection for underage refugees and their schooling. 

Another € 3.7 million was spent on security. The money also went to private security companies, which were much criticized by residents and NGOs for treating the refugees badly or simply not doing their job. Thus, despite the presence of the security guards, in May, a man was killed in the Ušivak camp. Funds were also used for fire alarms, fire extinguishers and first aid equipment. 

The political problems cannot be solved with more money

In summary, there is still room for improvement in the transparency of the use of funds. However, the accommodation of refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not primarily a financial problem, but a political one. The entities and cantons in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not want to host refugees, shift the responsibility back and forth, and use the refugees for a political blame game to put the blame on the respective other ethnic groups or parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have provided an overview of the political challenges in an Text on my homepage and also in my podcast described. 

However, despite all the justified criticism of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we must not forget why thousands of people are stuck there in the first place. Most of them have already been to EU countries such as Greece, where they were also treated inhumanely. And they want to move on, but they are being brutally and unlawfully beaten back by the Croatian authorities. The current terrible situation for refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina is therefore also the fault of the EU states, and the Commission in particular must ensure that they finally comply with the law. 

In the short term, better conditions for refugees must be created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it can be discussed whether more money can be used to help in one place or another. However, the fundamental political problem cannot be hidden under higher sums of money. We, as citizens of the European Union, must not accept that Bosnia-Herzegovina is being misused as a dumping ground for refugees and that they are repeatedly beaten back there. 

This is why it is so difficult to sue when human rights are violated

I am often asked why people on the run do not simply sue in a court of law when their elementary human rights are violated by EU states or Frontex. This question is very legitimate, but not easy to answer. In this text, I will address some key points that make it so difficult for people on the run to claim their rights. 

Human rights are rights that the state guarantees to every individual on its territory or under its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the respective court is always given when state actors such as police, border guards or the army encounter people in the exercise of their duties. State responsibility, on the other hand, is more difficult to prove and assert when EU actors such as Frontex or the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA) act.

The burden of proof lies with the plaintiffs 

Those who claim a violation of their human rights must first prove their own involvement. In the case of pushbacks, the nature of these acts makes it difficult to prove one's own presence at the scene, as witnesses who are not also perpetrators or victims usually do not exist. Fugitives who are on a boat on the high seas and are pushed back often have no way to provide evidence of their presence on the boat after the fact because, for example, people's cell phones are collected or destroyed, or at least cell phone videos are deleted. Without evidence, an individual case claiming to have been unlawfully „collectively expelled“ or „pushed back“ is unlikely to succeed.

Lack of access to justice 

Access to justice is another early hurdle in the legal action process. If a person is on the territory of the state which that person also accuses of violating the rights, the person concerned can bring such violations before the national court of first/lower instance. The EU legal order allows individuals to bring a case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) once all national remedies in the country concerned have been exhausted, i.e. all instances of the national legal system. Thus, if a person is encountered by the border guards of a state subject to the ECtHR at sea, on territorial or extraterritorial territory, the rights and obligations deriving from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) apply. However, such actions can in fact only be brought if the person concerned is in the infringing state. This is never the case with pushbacks, or at least not until an attempt to cross the border has succeeded.

All EU member states and also associated states are parties to the ECHR. As such, they can be sued before the ECtHR. 

Refugees cannot simply sue Frontex

Things get a bit more complex if, for example, Frontex is the authority that has potentially committed the violation. As an EU agency, an action against it cannot be brought before the ECtHR but only before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The ECJ, in turn, does not hear individual rights complaints, but rather disputes between organs. So e.g. EU member state against Frontex as EU authority. Moreover, it is not easy for the persons whose rights are violated by the illegal pushback to identify who is actually acting unlawfully in the specific case under the EU flag. The command of the operation can lie with an EU Member State, a third country with a status agreement with the EBCGA or with Frontex itself.

The EU and the individual Member States are bound by the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as EU law, i.e. regulations and directives. Cases brought before the ECJ must be referred to it by the Member States or by the European Commission, the so-called guardian of the Treaties and executive of the EU. The ECJ cannot take action itself on the basis of its own investigations. Since the EU member states currently have no great interest in the European border regime being permanently criticised by the ECJ, referrals to the ECJ on the basis of their own state investigations into Frontex do not take place. In the case of Croatia or Greece, the governments do not even admit that systematic or even individual pushbacks are taking place at all.

Thus, in order for a possible pushback by Frontex against individuals who are on a boat heading towards EU territory to be heard in Luxembourg – the seat of the ECJ –, the person concerned must first be able to prove his or her presence on the boat in question. Secondly, it must be clarified on which territory the pushback took place (usually not the biggest problem) and thirdly, this state must refer the case to the ECJ. 

Lack of clarity about who is actually responsible 

If the pushback took place on the high seas, i.e. not in the territorial waters of a state, then it must also be clarified on what basis Frontex was active there to protect the border. Frontex cannot be active without consultation with the EU Member State whose borders it secures; proceedings before the ECJ must then be initiated by the Member State on whose behalf Frontex was active here.

It is possible for the person concerned to lodge the complaint with Frontex itself. But here too, the evidence described above on the location, competence of the agency, etc. must be provided. Moreover, Frontex is at least ineffective in dealing with complaints.

Regardless of the possibilities and difficulties described above, it is even more complicated to file a lawsuit after a pushback from a third country.

Long and unrealistic legal action 

There are directives and regulations that bind EU member states to certain high standards, including in asylum policy. If rules, such as reception conditions, are violated by EU member states, either the European Commission initiates so-called infringement proceedings against the country to ensure that EU law is properly implemented, or a person suffering from the terrible conditions can initiate proceedings against the country in question for the suffering caused by the conditions. But again, they would have to go through the process of appeals, i.e. they would have to file a lawsuit in Germany with the locally competent administrative court, and if the lawsuit is dismissed, they would then go on to the competent higher administrative court, then to the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Constitutional Court. Only then can the case be referred to the ECtHR, which looks at the case from a human rights perspective and examines whether a country has violated certain ECHR rights of the person bringing the action...

In such individual proceedings, the inhuman, degrading conditions on the ground to which claimants are subjected, e.g. in a reception centre, could be challenged.Although the ECJ takes ECtHR judgments into account as precedents, the EU is not a party to the ECHR, so human rights violations by EU actors cannot be heard by the ECtHR.

Why even third parties hardly have a chance to sue successfully

When it comes to third parties who know about a human rights violation, their chance as human rights defenders, civil society organisations or interested individuals to sue on behalf of the victim is also very low. In the first instance, Member States or the European Commission have access to the Court of Justice of the EU, while the European Court of Human Rights is only accessible once all national remedies have been exhausted. Access for third parties other than the elected legal representative of the persons alleging human rights violations is not allowed without the active participation of the person concerned.

Despite obvious violations of the law, those affected have little chance to sue

In reality, these complex legal constructions mean that people on the run hardly have a chance to accuse those responsible if their basic human rights have been violated. Precisely because refugees are not citizens of an EU state and their fundamental rights are not protected by their states of origin, which is why most of them have to flee in the first place, they are usually defenceless against pushbacks, violence and undignified treatment. The fundamental rights of the United Nations, adopted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, do not apply to these people in reality. Their dignity is violated on a daily basis and yet they have hardly any possibility to defend themselves legally. 

Photo: European Court of Human Rights © BY-SA 3.0, CherryX

Question: Pushbacks by Frontex in the Aegean Sea

In order to be able to exercise my parliamentary control function as a Member of the European Parliament, I have the opportunity to put questions to the European Commission. The Commission must answer these questions.
Together with other Members, I put the following questions to the Commission:

Subject: Illegal refoulement by Frontex in the Aegean Sea

The German news magazine "Der Spiegel" today published research entitled "Frontex implicated in illegal pushbacks". The research proves in detail that officials of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) know about the illegal practices of the Greek border guards - and are partly involved in illegal pushbacks in the Aegean Sea themselves. Even though the systematic breaches of the law by Greek authorities have been known or at least obvious for months, Frontex has mostly denied even knowing about these illegal refoulements on the open sea.

The activities of Frontex and the Greek coast guard described in the article refute the Greek government's statements that border protection is being carried out in accordance with international law. Now Frontex is apparently also increasingly involved in the illegal activities.

1. since when has the Commission had information about the illegal practices of the Greek border guards or Frontex in operations at the Greek external EU border?

2. what measures the Commission intends to take to clarify these cases and ensure that international and Union law are complied with by its own agency?

3. whether the Commission is aware that, since March 2020 at the latest, EU Member States have been systematically breaking EU law at the EU's external borders, where people are mistreated and their lives put in danger, or whether the answer to this question also skilfully avoids the reality of the situation?

Answer given by Commissioner Ylva Johansson on behalf of the European Commission on 11/02/2021:

The Commission takes the allegations of pushback very seriously. Subject to the competences of the European Commission as guardian of the Treaties, national authorities are primarily responsible for the correct transposition and application of EU law. The Commission has repeatedly expressed its concerns about such reports. It has made clear that Member States have border surveillance tasks under the Schengen Borders Code.[1] fully respect fundamental rights, ensure access to international protection and guarantee protection against refoulement in accordance with Union and international law. In this context, the Commission has also urged the Greek authorities to investigate, in accordance with their competence, any alleged wrongdoing. Against this background, it is worth recalling the new migration and asylum package proposed by the Commission, which provides for all Member States to establish an independent monitoring mechanism to ensure the protection of fundamental rights at the external borders. At the formal request of the Commission, an urgent extraordinary meeting of the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) was convened on 10 November 2020 to discuss allegations of pushback operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Management Board shared the view that there was an urgent need to investigate all aspects of this matter. At the Management Board meeting of 25/26 November 2020, the matter was further discussed and a working group was established to investigate the matter in accordance with the procedure set out in Regulation[2] to further examine the established allocation of responsibilities. A second extraordinary meeting of the Management Board was convened on 9 December 2020 to review the Executive Director's written replies to questions from several members of the Management Board, including the Commission, and more generally to monitor progress in the internal investigation into alleged refoulement of migrants in the Aegean Sea.[3] The European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Secretariat General of the European Parliament are closely involved in this ongoing process and have also addressed oral and written questions to the Executive Director of the Agency. Frontex has also taken steps to fill more quickly the posts of Fundamental Rights Officer and Fundamental Rights Observers provided for in the Agency's founding Regulation.


[1] Regulation (EU) 2016/399 establishing a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1).

[2] Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1).

[3] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/extraordinary-meeting-frontex-management-board-9-december-2020_en

We're not safe from covid-19 until everyone is safe

The mutations of the coronavirus show that we are also affected if we exclude the global south from our vaccination campaigns.

The international health emergency declared by the WHO a year ago (on 30.01.2020) continues. In the meantime, well over 2 million deaths have been counted worldwide. In our globalized world, it is particularly evident that little can be expected from national go-it-alone efforts. Since the virus does not stop at national borders, a global vaccination strategy is needed that puts solidarity and sustainability before profit and leads to an increase in vaccine production capacities worldwide. 

The global immunisation strategy was the subject of the first plenary session of the year in the European Parliament. However, as a number of questions remained unanswered, particularly with regard to development policy, I suggested that the issue should also be taken up again in the Committee on Development. On 4 February, we MEPs therefore had the opportunity to meet again for a one-hour discussion. Debate with the Commissioner for Development Cooperation, Jutta Urpilainen.

Common European vaccination strategy

The EU Commission, together with the Member States (as the so-called "Team Europe"), has agreed on a joint approach to ensure sufficient vaccines for all Member States under good conditions and to distribute them fairly. Such joint action is welcome, even if there is still room for improvement, for example with regard to further coordinated measures to contain the virus. 

The fact that the EU is currently lagging behind in vaccination compared to, for example, the United Kingdom, has various reasons: Delays in the vaccination production process, bureaucratic hurdles and poor planning by many member states, but also simply the significantly higher population size.

Lack of transparency

(DE) Mr President, in response to repeated criticism from my colleagues in the European Parliament regarding the lack of transparency in the contracts concluded between the Commission and pharmaceutical companies, there has at least been some movement. Three of the six contracts are now publicly available, and another is before the EP, but key information remains blacked out. (DE) Mr President, one of the European Parliament's core tasks is to control the spending of public money. Transparency is urgently needed for this, if possible already during the contract negotiations.

Germany going it alone?

Germany is the EU country that has vaccinated the most people so far. Contrary to the European strategy, Germany bought 30 million additional vaccine doses from BioNTech/Pfizer and 20 million from CureVac. In this context, Germany has received a lot of criticism at the European level, also because the European vaccination strategy was developed under Commission President von der Leyen and under the German Council Presidency, so Germany would have had a much earlier influence on the low order quantities. With this national unilateral action, Germany may have committed a breach of the Treaty. A relapse into nationalist reflexes will not help us in our common fight against the coronal pandemic, especially as the 50 million doses can probably only be delivered once the EU orders have been completed.

Global immunization strategy

Even though the countries of the global South have so far recorded comparatively fewer Covid 19 deaths, the developments since the outbreak of the second wave are worrying. The sharp rise in deaths, the emergence of mutations of the virus in South Africa, among other places, and the overloading of health systems, especially in crisis areas, call for rapid intervention through vaccination campaigns. A solution approach is COVAX, the central mechanism of WHO, Gavi (Vaccine Alliance) and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), which aims to implement the global immunization strategy and has been funded by the EU to a major extent so far. The goal is to vaccinate 20% of the world's population by the end of 2021. While COVAX still lacks large amounts of funding for 2021, a sufficient supply of vaccines cannot be ensured due to production bottlenecks, and a 20% vaccination rate is far from sufficient for herd immunity, the EU, on the other hand, has secured at least 2.3 billion vaccine doses for a total population of 450 million people. 

COVAX can be an important mechanism to guarantee global distribution of the vaccine, but poorer countries must not rely on the goodwill of richer states to do so. Manufacturers must guarantee COVAX the necessary quantities of vaccines, while richer regions such as the EU should not secure more doses than necessary. Sufficient funding for COVAX must also be secured immediately.

The gamechanger: suspension of patent law and global distribution

The WHO proposal, initiated by India and South AfricaThe attempt to temporarily revoke patents on vaccines against the coronavirus within the framework of the Agreement of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has so far been unsuccessful. This would be an important step in many respects: vaccines are increasingly being developed in richer countries. If both the patents and the majority of the vaccine doses exist here, this will exacerbate global injustices in times of pandemic. While more than 100 countries have expressed support for the proposal so far, it has lacked approval from the EU, US and Canada, among others. Even vaccine manufacturer CureVac recently came out in favor of suspending patents to solve the crisis globally.This could help increase global production capacity to provide safe and affordable vaccines for all. The suspension of patents would also facilitate research in other areas of pandemic response, such as the development of medicines for people who cannot be vaccinated, for example, because of pre-existing conditions. This is an area in which it is essential for the European Parliament to adopt a position.

As long as the virus continues to run rampant, and at the same time vaccine production is artificially scarce through patents and made available to only a portion of the world, we will continue to chase the pandemic: If new mutations spread faster than we can produce vaccines against them, we face a race we can never win. That's why we need to ramp up global vaccine production and distribution now. 

European Parliament votes in favour of my report on border procedures

The European Parliament voted with a broad and cross-party majority in favour of my report on border procedures at the EU's external borders voted in favour. The demand is that fundamental and human rights be respected in asylum procedures and that compliance be monitored.

The European Parliament is thus showing its stance in the face of increasing restrictions on fundamental and human rights at the EU's external borders. It is a great success that a broad cross-party majority has found a compromise and is showing the will to find common solutions even on difficult issues. The broad cross-party majority calls for fundamental and human rights to be respected in asylum procedures and for compliance to be monitored. MEPs condemn illegal pushbacksand are concerned about the great lack of information, legal aid and support for protection seekers in border procedures and denied access of civil society organisations.

I welcome the fact that the vast majority of Members support our call for independent monitoring of the human rights situation at external borders. In all the Member States surveyed, people have been detained in border procedures, although detention on grounds of origin or on the basis of the asylum application is inadmissible. We call for fundamental and human rights to be put back at the heart of the asylum system.

Problems with border procedures

Boundary procedure means that EU member states examine the asylum applications of people seeking protection directly at their own borders and detain them there for the time being. In concrete terms, this practice leads to a situation like on the Greek islands, where people are sometimes stuck for years because their applications are simply not examined. Because of such conditions, the border procedures are also extremely controversial.

In current binding EU law, Member States can apply border procedures in a limited number of cases. The European Commission has now proposed mandatory border procedures in its recently published proposal for a new Pact on Asylum and Migration. The Commission wants to establish asylum applications at the EU's external borders as a new standard.  

Although the EU Commission wants to expand border procedures, it has never evaluated how border procedures are currently implemented. The study commissioned by the European Parliament, which provides the factual basis for this report, shows that border procedures do not currently contribute to the proper screening of asylum applications.

Findings of the report

When an asylum application is lodged at the border or in a transit zone, current EU law allows Member States to examine the application in these places under certain conditions. However, the study found that the term „border procedure“ is insufficiently and imprecisely defined in EU asylum law. This leads to different practices in the Member States examined, but similar problems arise everywhere vis-à-vis applicants in the examination of protection claims in border procedures. Border procedures are of particular concern with regard to their impact on fundamental rights and procedural guarantees.

Under EU law, people must be given the opportunity to apply for asylum at the border. However, at many of the EU's external borders, there are cases where persons seeking protection are refused entry or returned without their application being examined and asylum claims registered.

In their application, border procedures are often based on the legal fiction of non-entry. This has serious consequences for asylum seekers, as they are often denied entry for the duration of the border procedure. (de facto) be taken into detention. Such detention in some cases occurs without Member States categorising the stay in the border procedure as detention, so that asylum seekers detained in a border procedure do not even have access to basic procedural guarantees, while conditions at the borders are often inadequate.

Applicants should have the right under international and EU law to enter the territory of the Member State and not be detained for the sole reason that they wish to make an asylum application. If detention occurs, it must always be as short as possible and based on an individual judicial assessment as to its necessity, with the right to appeal.

In the case of large numbers of arrivals, such as on the Greek islands, these border procedures amount to inhumane conditions to which applicants are subjected over a long period of time. 

No adequate protection of vulnerable persons

It is also worrying that Member States do not have adequate mechanisms in place to identify unaccompanied minors, children and persons with special needs in order to exempt them from the border procedure. Research shows that all countries surveyed lack adequate and effective mechanisms to identify those in need of protection. This can also be traumatising, particularly for children, and raises serious questions about compliance with the best interests of the child. Furthermore, the reports describe significant problems with procedural safeguards in all Member States examined, which are contrary to EU law.

Applicants must be informed about their right to apply for international protection and about the different steps of the procedure, and they must be granted effective access to organisations and persons that support them. This is lacking in practice, although many Member States provide for the right to free legal assistance and access for civil society in national law. Short time limits and (de facto) detention often prevent effective access to legal aid. Asylum seekers are unable to contact a lawyer due to a lack of communication tools, insufficient time given to lawyers to prepare, or a complete lack of qualified lawyers. Non-governmental organisations often cannot fill the gap because they have limited or no access to facilities at the borders. Often there are no interpreters available.

Dilemma of border procedures

Border procedures are characterised by the dilemma of insufficient time for a fair procedure and the need to minimise time by detaining applicants. They therefore do not contribute to the objectives of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which aims to grant people international protection in a fair and expeditious procedure. 

Therefore, Member States should not be obliged to apply border procedures as a standard procedure for examining asylum applications, as on the one hand they cannot ensure a fair procedure and on the other hand they often violate the fundamental rights of applicants by detaining them for long periods of time. Exceptions where the border procedure can be used to examine asylum applications should be in a limited number of simple cases, e.g. where applicants have already been granted international protection in another (Member) State.

Brexit: Impact on development cooperation

At the beginning of this year, the transitional arrangements for the United Kingdom's exit from the EU expired. Brexit has had an impact on a wide variety of areas of the European Union's activities, which are gradually becoming visible. There are obvious and immediate effects, such as visa-free travel or customs duties, which are currently making headlines, especially with regard to the loss of sales by British fishermen, but also those whose extent is still difficult to foresee and assess. This also includes the issue of development cooperation.

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom, which entered into force provisionally on 01 January 2021 and still requires the approval of the European Parliament, contains no references to development cooperation or humanitarian aid. Only the sustainable development goals are mentioned in passing. With the UK's withdrawal, not only will the total EU budget be reduced, but there will also be less money available for development cooperation and humanitarian aid. It cannot be assumed that there will be closer cooperation on development or humanitarian measures in the foreseeable future. The general framework for UK participation in EU programmes set out in the agreement does not give the UK a say. Similarly, the recently negotiated new Development Cooperation and Neighbourhood Assistance Instrument does not include concrete provisions to facilitate early cooperation.

Drastic cuts in development cooperation

The nationalist tendencies in the UK – one of the reasons for the Brexit – have also led to the Johnson government recently announcing drastic cuts to the development budget from 0.7 % to 0.5 % of the national budget. 

Spending at least 0.7 % of gross national income is the target set by the United Nations. By comparison, spending in Germany was 0.6 % in 2019, while the EU average was just 0.46 %. Despite this worrying development, the UK remains an important player in development cooperation and humanitarian aid, also because of its high (project) experience. This was pointed out by the European Parliament's Development Committee last week. As part of the consultation procedure on the ratification of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, a short letter was drafted via the Committee on Development and addressed to the jointly responsible Trade and Foreign Affairs Committee. In it, we call for the UK to help minimise the negative impact of Brexit on developing countries and maintain its commitment to being at the forefront of development and humanitarian assistance. We equally hope for close coordination and cooperation between the EU and the UK as donors. This includes the possibility of drawing on each other's capacity to maximise efficiency, development effectiveness and progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals.

Hope for good cooperation in the future

To what extent these hopes will be fulfilled cannot be foreseen at the moment. It remains to be feared that in the near future there will rather be duplications of measures on the one hand and the discontinuation of aid on the other hand before a renewed constructive cooperation can be expected. A further commentary on possible effects can be found at here. What the budget cut in the UK could lead to for recipient countries, you read here.

Brexit: Impact on flight and migration

With Brexit, the general Freedom of movement between the EU and the UK, without a precise set of rules having been adopted to date. From 01/01/2021, all border crossings will be subject to existing EU and UK immigration laws. Of the latter, there will be visas for short-term stays, as well as regulations for the temporary movement of natural persons for business purposes.

Labour migration and service-related border crossings

An new, points-based migration system The UK's new migration system regulates entry criteria for skilled and border workers and people without citizenship who have lived in the UK for a long time. The new migration system distinguishes between skilled workers:inside and Low-skilled. While the former certain criteria there is no visa facilitation for the latter. From now on, their work is to be carried out only by British or Irish citizens or by people who already have a visa. (pre-)settled Enjoy Status. 

As settled is considered to be someone who has already lived in the UK for more than 5 years. Those affected will be granted unrestricted leave to remain. Those who have lived in the UK for less than 5 years are considered to be pre-settled and, upon reaching the 5-year mark, can settled-Apply for Status. Applications to obtain a respective status must be submitted by 30.06.21 to the  EU Settlement Scheme be put. 

EU citizens no longer preferred

EU citizens are no longer favoured by the new system. From now on, the same rules will apply to all people without British citizenship. Skilled workers outside the European Economic Area will particularly benefit from this. Compared to the previous Tier 2 (General) Visa is the new Skilled Worker Visa The minimum qualification and salary requirements were lowered, the annual cap on the number of work visas was suspended, and the labour market test was abolished. The latter required preference to be given to workers from the European Economic Area over others, even if they were better qualified. From now on, all applicants, regardless of their origin and immigration status, are to be given preference in the allocation of jobs. on equal terms become 

Since 01.01.2021, the EU and the UK are considered as respective Third countriesThe situation of cross-border workers and EU citizens who have been living in Great Britain for a long time and vice versa will be further complicated by the withdrawal agreement are protected. This guarantees EU citizens legally resident in the UK and British citizens legally resident in any of the 27 EU Member States at the end of the transition period, as well as their family members, broadly the same rights as they had before the UK left the EU: they can continue to live, study, work and travel freely between the UK and the EU. 

Border crossers:inside, the are from the EU, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland or Liechtenstein, live outside the UK, worked in the UK until 31.12.20 and work in the UK at least once a year can online a free border work permit (Frontier Worker Permit) apply. Family members are not covered here. 

To open Questions about travel and work arrangements to answer the question, the British government has Brexit Checker set up.

The situation for Fugitives

However, the new system does not refer to Protection seekers and omits important issues. The UK's departure from the Dublin system and the lack of a post-Dublin agreement in particular are causing uncertainty, as the UK continues to refuse to adopt the previous points. UK and France already agreed on measures to prevent uncontrolled crossings of the English Channel in November 2020. If no agreement is reached between the EU and the UK, further bilateral agreements are expected, in particular on family reunification and the prevention of illegal migration.

This will be particularly problematic for asylum seekers and their families in the EU and the UK: the current lack of clarity due to a lack of agreement between the EU and the UK would be exacerbated by bilateral agreements.Even if we reject the Dublin system and the responsibility of the country of first entry that goes with it, and instead advocate a a fair European asylum system demand: Without Dublin, much of the UK's family reunification would have been impossible. According to Infomigrants from now on, these are only possible if refugee status or subsidiary protection has already been granted. Reunification for unaccompanied minors are now only possible with their parents.To reach the UK, many protection seekers most likely have no other way than via traffickers and dangerous attempts to cross the sea, where many people are already drowning. 

Parliament must push for legal entry for protection seekers

Parliament must therefore press for this, that Arrangements are made immediately to provide legal means for those seeking protection and their dependants to reach the UK.. Unresolved questions on family reunification must be answered promptly and with due regard for the needs of the persons concerned. In addition, clarity must be provided on outstanding Dublin procedures. 

Also the situation of protection seekers in the United Kingdom must be followed up. There have already been complaints about inefficient asylum procedures in the UK. Now there are fears that there will be further delays in the process, as well as detentions and rejections of asylum seekers' claims in the UK. The government's aim is to discourage migration to the UK by limiting access to healthcare, work and even accommodation. No importance is attached to the integration of asylum seekers in order to encourage 'voluntary return'. Here, the government relies on the implementation of its own programme, largely independent of the EU. Instead of designing fair entry conditions for protection seekers, the focus is on the professional specialisation of people and their usefulness for the British labour market. There are fears of increasing vulnerability of those affected and disregard for fundamental human rights.

EN